NLRB Updates

NLRB Disciplinary Standard Shifts, but Questions Remain

APPLIES TO

All Employers Subject to the NLRA

EFFECTIVE

SEP 23, 2026

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • The NLRB applied the previously overruled and subsequently resurrected General Motors standard when evaluating an employer’s discipline of an employee for potentially protected activity, focusing on whether the employer acted because of the protected activity or because of the misconduct, instead of weighing setting-specific factors like where an outburst happened and whether the employer provoked it.
  • However, disagreement among the ruling Board members calls into question whether this ruling is meant to apply just to this case or more broadly.

Discussion

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) recently ruled in Lion Elastomers LLC (III) that the 2020 General Motors standard applied to the question: when does an employee who behaves abusively while engaged in protected activity, such as union work or raising group workplace concerns, lose the protection of federal labor law? In 2020, the Board found the employer had illegally threatened, disciplined, and fired a union representative for his protected activity (e.g., raising working condition concerns during a safety meeting that became heated). The new ruling doesn’t decide whether the company broke the law; rather, it sends the case back to an administrative law judge, who will look at the issue again under General Motors.

 

The road to this ruling explains why it matters. While the company’s original appeal was pending, the Board issued General Motors. That decision threw out several older tests, including Atlantic Steel for outbursts toward managers, the tests for social media posts and conversations between coworkers, and the test for picket-line conduct. In their place, it applied one test, called Wright Line, to all of these situations. The Board then asked the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to send the case back so it could apply the new standard. Instead, a newly constituted Board used the case in 2023 (Lion Elastomers II) to overturn General Motors and bring back the older tests. In 2024, the Fifth Circuit called this a “bait-and-switch.” It vacated the 2023 decision for two reasons: (1) the Board went beyond what the court had sent the case back to do, and (2) the company never got a fair chance to argue against the change. The court ordered the Board to apply General Motors to this case.

 

The biggest effect reaches well beyond this one dispute. A three-member majority concluded that because the court threw out the 2023 decision, the attempt to overrule General Motors never took effect, so General Motors remains Board precedent. In practice, the Board will ask whether the employer acted because of the protected activity or because of the misconduct, instead of weighing setting-specific factors like where an outburst happened and whether the employer provoked it. The government must show that the employee engaged in protected activity, that the employer knew about it, and that hostility toward that activity motivated the discipline. The employer can then defend itself by proving it would have taken the same action anyway. Chairman Murphy wrote separately to emphasize that the Board wasn’t voting to overrule precedent or deciding which test is better. The majority also said the question can be raised again in a future case that’s properly argued.

 

Member Prouty agreed the case should go back to the judge under General Motors, but he strongly disagreed about what this means for other cases. In his view, the court’s order covered only this case. He pointed to the Board’s long-standing policy of “nonacquiescence,” under which a single appeals court’s ruling doesn’t erase Board precedent, and he argued that the majority changed the law without the reasoned explanation federal law requires. He also argued that a separate 2024 decision, Intertape Polymer, which applied the older tests, still counts as precedent. The majority rejected that argument.

 

For now, employers can generally expect misconduct cases to be decided under General Motors. But this split, and the chance of further court challenges or a future reversal, means the standard may not be settled. For employers, the practical lesson holds either way: write down legitimate reasons for discipline and apply conduct rules consistently, so discipline can’t be seen as retaliation for protected activity.

 

Action Items

  1. Review employee discipline involving potentially protected activity with legal counsel.
  2. Document employee discipline consistently, accurately, and in a timely manner.

 


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

EEOC Updates

EEOC Moves to Rescind Employee Selection Guidance

APPLIES TO

All Employers with 15+ Employees

EFFECTIVE

TBD

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • The EEOC has submitted a final rule for regulatory review that would rescind the interpretive portions of its Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures.
  • Rescinding the guidelines would not eliminate disparate impact liability under Title VII.

Discussion

On October 16, 2026, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) submitted a final rule to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for review that would rescind the interpretive portions of its Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (UGESP). The EEOC’s regulatory agenda projected final action in November 2026 and an effective date in January 2027. However, the rule’s text has not been made public, and those projected dates are not confirmed compliance deadlines. Submission for regulatory review does not itself change employers’ obligations.

 

Selection Procedures and Validation. Adopted in 1978, the UGESP provides a framework for evaluating tests and other selection procedures used in employment decisions. Its reach extends beyond traditional employment tests to practices such as assessments, structured interviews, and AI-assisted tools used in hiring, promotion, and other employment decisions. The guidelines explain how employers can demonstrate that a selection procedure that produces a disparate impact is job-related and consistent with business necessity. Disparate impact occurs when a facially neutral practice disproportionately disadvantages members of a protected group.

 

The pending rule would withdraw what the EEOC describes as the guidelines’ “interpretive” portions, which are expected to include guidance on identifying adverse impact and validating selection procedures. Because the text is not yet public, the precise provisions to be removed and the full scope of the change remain unclear.

 

Underlying Liability Remains. The proposed rescission is part of a broader shift away from federal disparate impact enforcement. However, disparate impact liability arises under Title VII itself, not solely from the guidelines. Rescinding the UGESP would therefore remove an established framework for demonstrating compliance, but would not eliminate the underlying statutory requirements or prevent private plaintiffs from bringing claims.

 

Under Title VII, employers whose selection procedures cause a disparate impact must still demonstrate that those procedures are job-related for the position and consistent with business necessity. State and local requirements also remain independently applicable, including laws addressing discriminatory effects from automated employment decision tools.

 

Separate Recordkeeping Proposal. The EEOC is also pursuing a separate proposal to rescind the UGESP’s recordkeeping requirements. Under UGESP, each employer must maintain records and other information for each job sufficient to permit analyses of the impact of its selection procedures on the employment opportunities of people based on race, sex, or ethnic group.

 

Neither action would alter compliance obligations with the EEOC’s general employment records retention rule. Employers must also consider other applicable retention requirements and any obligation to preserve records relevant to pending claims or litigation.

 

For now, employers should maintain current compliance practices and monitor publication of the final rule(s). Once the text and effective date are available, employers can assess whether internal policies, vendor agreements, or validation procedures need revision.

 

Action Items

  1. Monitor publication of the final rule(s).
  2. Consult with legal counsel before changing selection procedures, validation practices, or demographic data collection procedures.

 

 

EEOC Rescinds Criminal Background Check Hiring Guidance

The EEOC announced on October 29, 2026, that it rescinded its 2012 enforcement guidance on the consideration of arrest and conviction records in employment decisions, effective immediately. The EEOC clarified that the rescission does not restore policy statements superseded by the guidance or require employers to abandon lawful practices adopted in response to it. While the repeal reflects a shift in federal enforcement priorities, it does not amend Title VII or eliminate employers’ potential liability for discriminatory screening practices. Employers remain prohibited from treating applicants differently based on protected characteristics, and private plaintiffs may continue to bring disparate impact claims challenging facially neutral screening policies that disproportionately disadvantage a protected group. State and local fair chance laws also remain in effect, including requirements governing the timing of background checks, permissible records, individualized assessments, and adverse decisions. Employers using third-party consumer reporting agencies must also continue complying with the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Employers should review existing screening practices for compliance with applicable laws and consult with legal counsel before making changes based solely on the rescission.

 


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

Other Federal Agency Updates

DOL Withdraws Older Tip Credit Guidance

APPLIES TO

As Indicated

EFFECTIVE

OCT 19, 2026

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • The DOL withdrew three opinion letters addressing tip credit eligibility when tipped employees perform related duties that do not directly produce tips.
  • The DOL confirmed that guidance imposing specific time limits on duties performed within a tipped occupation no longer reflects its enforcement policy.

Discussion

On October 19, 2026, the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Wage and Hour Division (WHD) issued Field Assistance Bulletin 2026-1 (FAB), withdrawing three opinion letters from 1979, 1980, and 1985 addressing tip credit eligibility for non-tip-producing duties. The FAB also confirms that the agency’s former “80/20” guidance, which was removed from its Field Operations Handbook in January 2025, no longer reflects WHD policy. As a result, employers should no longer rely on the withdrawn letters or handbook provision as WHD enforcement guidance.

 

Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), eligible employers may count a portion of employees’ tips toward their minimum wage obligation. The federal “dual jobs” regulation permits a tip credit for related duties within a tipped occupation, such as a server setting tables, but not for work in a separate, non-tipped occupation, such as maintenance. Following a 2024 court decision invalidating the DOL’s time-based restrictions on related duties, the agency removed those restrictions and withdrew its corresponding handbook guidance. The October FAB withdraws the older opinion letters that remained available and confirms that guidance imposing specific time limits on duties within a tipped occupation no longer reflects WHD policy.

 

The withdrawal does not permit employers to apply a tip credit to all work assigned to a tipped employee. Employers must still distinguish duties within the tipped occupation from work in a separate, non-tipped occupation. Other tip credit conditions, including employee notice and minimum wage requirements, also remain applicable. Additionally, some courts continue to apply an 80/20 framework, and state or local laws may impose stricter requirements, require higher wages, or prohibit tip credits entirely. Employers should review the requirements applicable to each location before changing duty assignments or pay practices.

 

Action Items

  1. Review compliance with applicable tip credit conditions.
  2. Consult with legal counsel on the application of jurisdictional requirements to specific tipping practices.

 

 

DEA Temporarily Pauses Marijuana Rescheduling

Effective September 29, 2026, the chief administrative law judge (ALJ) for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has temporarily paused marijuana rescheduling. The pause is to consider a new report issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Under an executive order issued late last year, the U.S. Attorney General was instructed to reschedule marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule III. In response, the DEA published a final rule which took effect on April 28, 2026, and placed “drug products containing marijuana that have been approved by the FDA” and “marijuana subject to a state medical marijuana license” in Schedule III. The ALJ then held hearings on whether to move all marijuana products to Schedule III. The GAO report recommended that: (1) DEA develop policies and procedures for evaluating and scheduling substances; (2) the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) develop policies and procedures for conducting evaluations and developing recommendations; and (3) FDA and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) update their Memorandum of Understanding for sharing information to reflect current entities and procedures.

 

SBA Removes Disparate Impact Provisions for Financial Assistance Recipients

Effective September 29, 2026, the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) amended its Title VI regulations to remove disparate impact provisions and provisions authorizing or requiring certain race-conscious affirmative action measures. The changes apply to businesses applying for or receiving SBA financial assistance covered by the regulations and do not change eligibility for SBA contracting programs. Importantly, the SBA clarified that data showing disparate outcomes may still be used to help prove intentional discrimination, even though those disparities no longer provide an independent basis for disparate impact liability under the revised regulations. The rule does not change Title VII’s disparate impact provisions or applicable state and local protections. Covered businesses should confirm which requirements apply to their SBA relationships, continue complying with applicable recordkeeping and preservation obligations, and consult with legal counsel before changing nondiscrimination policies or workforce data practices.

 

FAR Council Proposed Governmentwide Contracting Exclusions for DEI Clause Violations

On September 18, 2026, the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (FAR Council) published a proposed rule that would expressly identify noncompliance with FAR clause 52.222-90, Addressing DEI Discrimination by Federal Contractors, as grounds for debarment or suspension from federal contracting. The clause, already being implemented through agency class deviations, prohibits disparate treatment based on race or ethnicity in employment, contracting, program participation, and resource allocation. It also includes compliance reporting requirements and must flow down to subcontracts at any tier when delivery or performance occurs in the United States. If finalized, the proposal would expressly incorporate governmentwide exclusion into the FAR’s debarment and suspension framework, in addition to existing contract-level remedies and potential False Claims Act exposure. Debarment or suspension would not be automatic, but could prevent a contractor from receiving new awards across federal agencies. Contractors should confirm whether their contracts include the clause, review covered policies and practices with legal counsel, and evaluate subcontract flow-down and reporting procedures.

 


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

Federal Court Updates

Second Circuit: Expanded Interpretation of Protected Activity Under Title VII Anti-Retaliation Clause

APPLIES TO

All Employers with Employees in CT, NY, and VT

EFFECTIVE

SEP 21, 2026

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • The Second Circuit ruled that refusing to settle a retaliation claim may be protected activity, but only in context.
  • The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA) does not reach claims that accrued before March 3, 2022.

Discussion

In Newton v. LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton Inc., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that refusing to settle retaliation claims can be a protected activity under Title VII in this particular case, and the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA) does not apply to certain claims because they accrued before its effective date. Here, the plaintiff was hired as in-house litigation counsel and signed an arbitration agreement. She alleged that the company director sexually harassed her between 2015 and 2018, but subsequent internal investigations dismissed the allegations and found no policy violations. She also alleged that the General Counsel then retaliated against her by limiting the cases assigned to her, giving her a negative performance review, denying remote work during the COVID-19 pandemic, denying a promotion, and excluding her from certain events. She was invited to testify before the U.S. Congress about the harassment and claimed that the retaliation increased. She was then terminated. While still employed, she brought claims under New York state law for retaliation and harassment. These claims were moved to arbitration. A separate federal action was filed after her termination for retaliation and hostile work environment under Title VII and New York state law. The action also sought to enjoin the ongoing arbitration.

 

For her claim of retaliation under Title VII and New York state law, the plaintiff argued that her refusal to meet with her supervisor to discuss settlement of the claims she filed prior to her termination was protected activity. In reaching its ruling, the court considered “whether the employer understood or could reasonably have understood that the plaintiff’s refusal was an assertion of her continued opposition to the employer’s unlawful employment practices in violation of Title VII.” The court agreed that this was a reasonable conclusion. The plaintiff had continuously and publicly pursued her claims for three years prior to the refusal to discuss settlement. The court stopped short of ruling that any such refusal was a protected activity – only that it was under these specific circumstances.

 

As to the claim that the EFAA voided the arbitration agreement, the court found the EFAA only applies to disputes or claims that arise or accrue on or after March 3, 2022. Her new claims for hostile work environment were materially identical to her original claim filed in June 2021, so they accrued before the EFAA took effect. The claims did not “re-accrue” after March 3, 2022. They were not a continuing violation that could void the arbitration agreement. Additionally, an amended complaint has no legal effect unless leave to amend is granted, so the proposed claims never became a part of the plaintiff’s federal case. Employers should note the ruling in this case is narrow and applies to the specific circumstances in this particular case. Employers should always consult with legal counsel regarding arbitration agreements and before taking an adverse action against an employee who has made a claim of harassment, discrimination, or retaliation.

 

Action Items

  1. Review arbitration agreements with legal counsel.
  2. Promptly investigate claims of harassment, discrimination, and retaliation.
  3. Consult with legal counsel prior to taking adverse action against an employee who has engaged in potentially protected activity.
  4. Have appropriate personnel trained on responding to employee complaints.

 

Second Circuit: Required Early Arrival May Result in Compensable Time

APPLIES TO

All Employers with Employees in CT, NY, and VT

EFFECTIVE

OCT 13, 2026

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • If an employer requires employees to report at a set time, and they can’t start work or clock in for reasons beyond their control (such as a late manager with the keys), the wait can be compensable.
  • Employers that require arrival before the scheduled start, or before employees can clock in, risk wage-and-hour exposure.

Discussion

In Santos v. Lidl US, LLC, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that waiting time is compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) when an employer requires an employee to report at a certain time to be ready to work and, for reasons beyond the employee’s control, there is no work to be done. Here, the plaintiff store clerk and stocker worked an opening shift where she was required to report 15 minutes before the listed start time. However, employees could not clock in until the store was unlocked. Sometimes opening managers were late to unlock the store. The plaintiff alleged that this resulted in 15 minutes of unpaid wages per week, some of which resulted in overtime, in violation of the FLSA’s and the New York Labor Law’s (NYLL) prohibition on time-shaving.

 

The court’s ruling relied on 29 C.F.R. Section 790.7(h) interpreting the Portal-to-Portal Act, which distinguishes an employee who “was engaged to wait” (compensable) from one who “waited to be engaged” (not compensable). Waiting is not compensable when the employee arrives voluntarily before the time the employer requires, but, here, the employee was required to arrive early. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that employees could use the time for their own purposes, like reading or paying bills. The court also found that compensable time where the employee was “engaged to wait” is not limited to traditional on-call employees like firefighters and limousine drivers as the defendant argued. The court also failed to find that fifteen minutes of uncompensated work time per week was de minimis. This interpretation was also applied to the NYLL claim which was considered as falling within the FLSA claim. Requiring employees to arrive before their shifts begin and before they can clock in may create compensable waiting time.

 

Action Items

  1. Review and revise scheduling and timekeeping procedures, if applicable.
  2. Have appropriate personnel trained on scheduling and timekeeping requirements.

 

 

Fourth Circuit: No Religious Employer Exemptions for Non-Ministerial Workers

On October 16, 2026, in Doe v. Catholic Relief Services, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that terminating a non-ministerial employee’s dependent health insurance benefits for his same-sex spouse violated Title VII and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act. Here, a data analyst with the defendant received health coverage for himself and his husband. The coverage was subsequently revoked after internal discussions about Catholic doctrine on same-sex marriage. The court found Title VII’s religious-employer exemption does not shield religious organizations from liability for discrimination based on sex, race, or national origin, even when the employment decision is motivated by religious belief. In addition, neither the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) nor the church autonomy doctrine provided immunity involving a non-ministerial employee. Religious employers should be aware that the ruling reinforces a clear distinction between protected ministerial positions and administrative and technical positions.

 

Fifth Circuit: Qualified Immunity Does Not Shield Public Officials From FLSA Retaliation Claims

On October 27, 2026, in Stramaski v. Lawley, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that public officials sued personally for retaliation under the FLSA cannot invoke qualified immunity, a defense that typically shields officials from certain lawsuits arising from their official duties. The case involved a public-university employee who alleged that her supervisor fired her after she asserted her right to timely pay. The court concluded that extending qualified immunity to FLSA retaliation claims would undermine the law’s protection of employees who assert wage-and-hour rights. While the ruling allowed the claim to proceed, it did not establish that retaliation occurred, meaning the supervisor may still contest the allegations on their merits. Public employers in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi should ensure supervisors understand the FLSA’s anti-retaliation protections and that employment decisions involving employees who raise pay concerns should be supported by legitimate, documented reasons.

 

Ninth Circuit: Court Upholds Block on California’s Captive Audience Law

APPLIES TO

As Indicated

EFFECTIVE

OCT 29, 2026

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • The Ninth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction preventing California officials from enforcing the state’s captive-audience law under SB 399.
  • The court found that the law’s restrictions on employer communications about political and religious matters likely violate the First Amendment.

Discussion

In California Chamber of Commerce v. Bonta, the Ninth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction blocking California officials from enforcing SB 399 while the legal challenge proceeds. The court concluded that the employer associations challenging the law were likely to succeed on their First Amendment claim. Of note, this ruling only preserves the preliminary block on enforcement of the law, rather than finally resolving the lawsuit.

 

SB 399, which took effect January 1, 2025, prohibits employers from taking or threatening adverse action against employees who decline to attend employer-sponsored meetings or receive communications intended to convey the employer’s opinions about political or religious matters. Political matters include legislation, regulation, and decisions to join or support a political or labor organization. The law also requires continued pay for employees who are working when a covered meeting occurs but choose not to attend.

 

In this case, the state argued that the law regulates employer conduct, not speech, because it restricts adverse action against employees rather than prohibiting employers from expressing their views. The court disagreed, opining that whether the law applies depends on the message communicated at the meeting, making it a restriction based on speech content. The court also determined that the law singles out the employer’s opinions for regulation.

 

Therefore, the court applied strict scrutiny, which requires a law to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. It rejected California’s argument that protecting employees as a “captive audience” justified these content-based restrictions on private workplace speech. Based on that analysis, the court found that the challengers were likely to prevail on their First Amendment claim. Notably, the court did not decide whether the National Labor Relations Act preempts SB 399.

 

Although the ruling directly concerns the parties in this case and California’s SB 399, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning may affect the enforceability of similar captive-audience laws in other states within the circuit, including Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington. The decision does not itself block those laws, but it may support challenges to comparable restrictions on employer speech. Employers should continue to monitor legal interpretations of similar restrictions in their jurisdictions.

 

Action Items

  1. Review the ruling’s implications with legal counsel before revising workplace meeting policies or practices.
  2. Monitor further proceedings for changes to the injunction or for a final ruling.

 

 

Tenth Circuit: Employment Class is Scrutinized for FAA Exemption

On September 1, 2026, in Joyner v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals said that whether a class of employees qualified for the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) exemption as a “transportation worker,” thereby exempting them from being compelled to arbitration, must be determined based on what work the whole group of workers typically does, not just the named representatives of the class. Here, the class action representatives worked at airline ticket counters and boarding gates at the airport and claimed they regularly handled passenger luggage, part of the interstate movement of goods. However, working for a transportation company doesn’t automatically make someone a transportation worker exempt from the FAA. The court did not decide whether the employees actually qualify as transportation workers. It sent the case back to the trial court to define the group correctly and apply the test again.

 

Eleventh Circuit: Courts To Consider Discrimination Evidence as a Whole

On September 1, 2026, in Hall v. Coal Bed Services, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit reversed a ruling dismissing race discrimination and retaliation claims before trial, finding sufficient evidence for the claims to proceed to a jury. In this case, two Black employees presented evidence that a White coworker who also refused a drug test received more favorable pay and reinstatement treatment, despite differences in his duties and tenure. They also identified inconsistencies in the employer’s explanation for the test, which it described as random to the EEOC but later attributed to a report of suspected drug use. Considering this evidence alongside testimony about unequal work assignments and advancement opportunities, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence for a jury to consider the employees’ race discrimination and retaliation claims. The decision serves as a reminder to employers in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia that courts consider circumstantial evidence collectively, sometimes described as a “convincing mosaic,” and that favorable treatment of a coworker may be relevant even when that employee is not similarly situated in all material respects. It also illustrates how inconsistent explanations can undermine an employer’s defense.

 

Eleventh Circuit: Internal Plan Appeals Not Required for ERISA Statutory Claims

On October 13, 2026, in Bolton v. Inland Fresh Seafood Corporation of America, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals overruled its longstanding precedent requiring participants to exhaust a benefit plan’s internal claims and appeals process before filing statutory claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The ruling, which applies retroactively, allows participants to bring claims such as breach of fiduciary duty or retaliation directly in court without first completing that process. Importantly, the decision does not eliminate the exhaustion requirement for claims seeking benefits under a plan. Employers and plan sponsors in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia should be aware that statutory ERISA claims may now proceed without an opportunity to address them through internal plan procedures. Plan sponsors should review plan documents and summary plan descriptions with benefits counsel to ensure that exhaustion requirements for benefit claims are clearly stated as mandatory and are distinguished from statutory claims.

 

D.C. Circuit: Court Clarifies Business Necessity Defense for Layoff Practices

On September 4, 2026, in Davis v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld judgment for the District on racial disparate impact claims challenging two reduction-in-force practices: (1) consolidating two support positions into a smaller number of hybrid roles and (2) selecting additional employees for termination based on operational needs identified through management consultations. Although Black employees were disproportionately affected, the court held that the practices reasonably fit the agency’s legitimate interests in meeting substantial budget cuts while maintaining essential public services. The court explained that business necessity requires a reasonable, not perfect, fit between the challenged practice and the employer’s legitimate interests. The employees also failed to identify a sufficiently specific, equally effective alternative with less disparate impact. The decision illustrates the importance of connecting particular layoff practices to operational needs, rather than relying solely on a general need to reduce costs. Employers planning a reduction in force should work closely with legal counsel to document the rationale for their selection practices and assess potential discriminatory effects and alternatives.

 

Maryland District Court: Denies Preliminary Injunction of Executive Order 14398

On October 14, 2026, in National Association of Diversity Officers in Higher Education v. Trump, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland denied a preliminary injunction to prevent implementation of Executive Order 14398 while legal challenges continue. The executive order requires federal contracts and subcontracts to include a clause that the contractor will not engage in any racially discriminatory DEI activities. For the purposes of the executive order, “racially discriminatory DEI activities” means disparate treatment based on race or ethnicity in the recruitment, employment (e.g., hiring, promotions), contracting (e.g., vendor agreements), program participation, or allocation or deployment of an entity’s resources. The court stated that it denied the preliminary injunction because the executive order was narrow and only applied to work that was performed under covered contracts. Contractors also had the right to challenge any enforcement action made under the executive order. Federal contractors should continue to monitor the status of the executive order and consult with their legal counsel as there are other legal challenges pending.

 


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

California

California: Fair Chance Act Individualized Assessments Cannot be Second-Guessed

APPLIES TO

All Employers with Employees in CA

EFFECTIVE

SEP 18, 2026

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • Courts and juries cannot second-guess an employer’s individualized assessment under the California Fair Chance Act.
  • The Fair Chance Act does not require an employer to hire an individual with a criminal background in the event there is no direct and adverse relationship between the job and the conviction.
  • Cutting the five-day response period short following an individualized assessment is a violation of the Fair Chance Act, but damages can only be awarded for actual harm, not just a procedural violation.

Discussion

In McInerney v. Regents of the University of California, a California Court of Appeal said that courts and juries cannot second-guess an employer’s individualized assessment under the California Fair Chance Act. Specifically, the Fair Chance Act requires employers to conduct an individualized assessment of the nature of the offense, how much time has passed, and the nature of the job, plus give notice and a chance to respond before rescinding an offer.

 

Here, a former UCLA student was turned down for a campus job because of his criminal record. After he received a conditional offer in 2021 for an office assistant job, a public-facing role that required a background check, the screening revealed four drug convictions from 2005 to 2007. UCLA sent him a letter giving him five business days to provide evidence of rehabilitation. Instead of providing any, he sent HR staff angry emails, using profanity and comparing UCLA to “North Korea” and the “Inquisition.” UCLA rejected him after only two days, not the full five that California’s Fair Chance Act requires. The decision-maker testified that the main reason was that the plaintiff gave no evidence of rehabilitation in response to the letter.

 

The court noted that the Fair Chance Act is a procedural law employers must follow when conducting background checks; it does not contemplate second-guessing employment decisions. It also does not require an employer to hire an individual with a criminal background in the event there is no direct and adverse relationship between the job and the conviction. In contrast, similar laws in New York, Minnesota, and Hawaii expressly ban rejecting an applicant unless the conviction relates to the job. The court also said that the Fair Chance Act did not prohibit consideration of convictions seven or more years old. The court said the seven-year rule applies only to “bright-line” hiring policies that disproportionately affect protected groups, not to individual cases like this.

 

Finally, the court said that cutting the five-day response period short is a violation of the Fair Chance Act, but the applicant is not entitled to damages unless the violation actually hurt him. Under general California law, a plaintiff must show the violation caused harm, and unlike some other laws, the Fair Chance Act doesn’t provide automatic “statutory damages” for a violation. Here, the jury found his criminal history was not a substantial factor in the decision and that UCLA would have made the same decision even if he’d had the full five days.

 

Action Items

  1. Review background check procedures for compliance with the Fair Chance Act.
  2. Accurately document the reason for rescinding an offer of employment.
  3. Have appropriate personnel trained on background screening procedures.

 

 

California: Supervisors Cannot Be Personally Sued for Retaliation Under Labor Code Section 1102.5

On September 28, 2026, in Chaudhry v. State of California, the California Court of Appeal said that supervisors cannot be sued personally for retaliation under Labor Code Section 1102.5, California’s general whistleblower law. Here, a dental assistant at a prison medical facility filed several workplace safety complaints with Cal/OSHA. She says the facility retaliated with unfair criticism, a one-month unpaid suspension, a firing in 2020, and a second firing in 2022. She sued the employer and three supervisors under California’s general whistleblower law (Labor Code section 1102.5) and the California Whistleblower Protection Act. In rejecting the claims against the individual supervisors, the court reasoned that making supervisors personally liable would add little for employees, would make managers afraid to make ordinary personnel decisions, and would set supervisors against their employers. It also noted that the Legislature never said it meant to hold supervisors personally liable.

 

California: Proposed Updates to Pregnancy Accommodation and Leave Rules

On October 19, 2026, the California Civil Rights Council released proposed regulations that would expand pregnancy-related accommodation and leave protections and align state rules with the federal Pregnant Workers Fairness Act. The proposal would expressly cover past, potential, and intended pregnancy, infertility and fertility treatment, and additional related conditions, including postpartum anxiety and psychosis, pregnancy loss, abortion, and lactation conditions. Accommodation options would include remote work, worksite changes, pain-reducing modifications, and temporary suspension of essential job functions. Employers would be required to respond to accommodation requests “as soon as practicable” through an informal, good-faith interactive process. The proposal would also clarify that intermittent pregnancy disability leave may be used for childbirth and related medical conditions and eliminate the general requirement that bonding leave be taken in two-week increments. The proposal is not final and does not change current obligations. Employers should monitor the rulemaking process and assess how the proposed changes could affect accommodation procedures and leave policies.

 

California: Headless PAGA Claims Permitted Under Post-2024 Law

On October 23, 2026, in Castillo v. Belkorp AG, LLC, the California Court of Appeal said that an aggrieved employee may bring a Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) action that consists only of nonindividual (“headless”) PAGA claims under the post-July 1, 2024 version of PAGA, without also bringing individual claims. There is a split of authority on whether headless PAGA claims are permitted under the pre-July 1, 2024 version of PAGA; this ruling expands the argument post-amendment. The ruling was based largely on statutory interpretation, case precedent, and the fact that the legislature has not otherwise amended the law to prohibit headless PAGA claims despite the opportunity. This case further contributes to the overall split in authority on PAGA generally and increases the likelihood of California Supreme Court intervention on the topic.

 

San Mateo County, CA: Permit Required for Certain Workplace Robots

Effective October 29, 2026, a new ordinance in unincorporated San Mateo County will require certain public-facing businesses to obtain an annually renewable County permit before operating certain fully or partially autonomous robots. Covered robots include those that use cameras or sensors, operate at least partly without human control in areas accessible to workers or the public, and use rechargeable lithium-ion batteries. Stationary self-checkout kiosks and permanently fixed-path equipment are excluded. Permit applications must address applicable safety, accessibility, privacy, and food-safety requirements and include an Economic Impact Assessment and Workforce Mitigation Plan. If deployment of a covered robot displaces workers, the mitigation plan must provide for at least one of three options: (1) redeployment to an equivalent position at equal or greater compensation; (2) transition assistance consisting of at least 60 days’ advance written notice and four weeks of standard pay as severance; or (3) payment of a County Automation Impact Fee. Businesses must also plan for at least one trained human supervisor to remain physically present whenever covered robots operate in customer- or public-facing areas and maintain a public complaint log for each robot. Affected employers should confirm location and equipment coverage, address permitting before deployment, and review workforce, safety, and privacy practices. Violations may result in fines and permit suspension or revocation.

 

California: Public Works Employers Barred from Using Evidence for Procedural Violations

As of January 1, 2027, SB 1316 will prohibit public works contractors from being able to rely on certain payroll, time, and employment records to defend themselves if those records are not timely produced upon request. Specifically, this penalty occurs when the Labor Commissioner requests records that a contractor or subcontractor is legally required to maintain, and the employer fails to produce them within the time stated in the written request, and no statutory exception otherwise applies. Employers that do not timely produce required documents may be precluded from using them.

 

California: Mid-Project Prevailing Wage Changes for Large Public Works Contracts

Effective July 1, 2027, AB 1198 will require updated prevailing wage determinations to apply during performance of covered California public works contracts with an awarded prime contract value of $35 million or more. Currently, rates generally remain tied to those in effect at bid, subject to predetermined increases. The new requirements will also apply to subcontractors on covered projects regardless of their subcontract’s value, but qualifying affordable housing developments are exempt. The law does not specify who bears the cost of mid-project increases, so contractors should review bid pricing and contract terms in preparation.

 


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

Georgia

Discussion

Georgia:  District Court Requires Consistent and Objective Criteria for RIFs Involving FMLA Employees

On September 28, 2026, in Donald v. TOPPAN USA, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia highlighted the importance of consistent selection criteria and documentation when a reduction in force (RIF) affects an employee using leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The employee, who had increased his use of intermittent FMLA leave to care for his wife, was among 15 employees selected for layoff following a significant production slowdown. The employer attributed his selection to his seniority relative to other production supervisors. However, questions about the employer’s internal documentation, its retention of employees in comparable roles, the employee’s satisfactory performance, and the availability of other positions called that explanation into question. The ruling serves as a reminder that a legitimate business reason for conducting a RIF does not necessarily establish a lawful reason for selecting a particular employee. Employers conducting a RIF should work closely with legal counsel to develop and consistently apply objective selection criteria, document the reasons for individual selections, and ensure protected leave does not factor into those decisions.


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

Illinois

Discussion

Illinois: Equal Pay Reporting Updates Coming in 2027

The Illinois Department of Labor (IDOL) has updated its Equal Pay Registration Certificate (EPRC) FAQs to address demographic reporting changes. Beginning in January 2027, IDOL will no longer accept submissions using “prefers not to identify” for employees’ race/ethnicity or sex. Covered employers should offer employees an opportunity to voluntarily self-identify, but if an employee declines, the FAQs advise that employers may use employment records or observer identification to complete the required fields. Demographic records should be maintained separately from personnel files and other records available to those making personnel decisions. IDOL also shortened its process for addressing overdue or missing filings from three steps to two and clarified that EPRC obligations will continue regardless of any federal changes to EEO-1 reporting. Separately, IDOL is considering employer self-audit tools following an analysis of submitted pay data, but the study’s recommended pay-gap thresholds are not identified as adopted enforcement standards.


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

Maryland

Discussion

Maryland: Worker Freedom Act Notice Now Available

The Maryland Department of Labor has published the required employee notice under the Maryland Worker Freedom Act, which took effect October 1, 2026. Beginning November 1, 2026, employers must physically post the notice where employees can easily see it and provide it to employees at the time of hire. The notice is available in English and Spanish. Covered employers should ensure the notice is posted and incorporated into new-hire materials.


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

Massachusetts

Massachusetts: Employers Must Show “Irreparable Harm” for Preliminary Injunction in Trade Secret Cases

APPLIES TO

All Employers with Employees in MA

EFFECTIVE

OCT 14, 2026

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • Showing a likelihood of success on a trade secret claim does not automatically entitle an employer to a preliminary injunction in Massachusetts.
  • Lost sales, maintenance contracts, and customer relationships can generally be remedied with money damages.

Discussion

In Daikin Applied Americas Inc. v. Russo, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled employers seeking a preliminary injunction in trade secret cases to stop former employees from starting competing businesses must demonstrate “irreparable harm.” Here, the employer, Daikin, provides and maintains HVAC systems for clients. The defendants, a service supervisor and a technician who had access to customer data and pricing information, emailed such information to their personal email accounts. While still employed, they also formed a competing business before subsequently leaving Daikin. Daikin then sued for trade secret misappropriation under the Massachusetts Uniform Trade Secrets Act. There was no noncompete or customer non-solicitation agreement in place for either employee. Daikin sought a preliminary injunction asking for a one-year bar on soliciting 75 customers.

 

In reaching its ruling, the court looked at the following requirements under Massachusetts law for a preliminary injunction: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a showing that the party will suffer irreparable harm without an injunction; and (3) a showing that the risk of “irreparable harm” to the moving party outweighs the harm to the nonmoving party. Daikin argued that the irreparable harm element was presumed based on federal district court cases. However, the court found that the U.S. Supreme Court rejected such presumptions of irreparable harm in patent and copyright cases. Federal appellate decisions also declined to presume harm in trade secret cases.

 

The court found that in this case, Daikin offered no evidence of the loss of goodwill. It only identified the 75 customers at issue. The court found that Daikin could have quantified lost HVAC sales and maintenance contracts with historical data and sought monetary damages but did not do so. Injunctions are reserved for when the resulting harm cannot be remedied through monetary damages.

 

Action Items

  1. Consult with legal counsel on potential or suspected trade secret violations.
  2. Review and draft restrictive covenant agreements with legal counsel.

 

 

Massachusetts: Court Examines Noncompete Agreement Language and Scope

On August 31, 2026, in Fresenius USA Manufacturing, Inc. v. Much, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted preliminary injunctive relief to an employer seeking to enforce a noncompete against an executive who joined a direct competitor. Although the agreement did not specifically name the employing entity, the court found that it adequately identified the employer as a subsidiary of the named entity and was signed by individuals authorized to act on the employer’s behalf. The court also found that the restrictions were narrowly tailored to protect the employer’s legitimate business interests and that the executive’s new work was substantially similar to at least some of his responsibilities during his final two years with the employer. The ruling illustrates that omitting the employing entity’s specific name does not necessarily defeat enforcement when the agreement otherwise adequately identifies the parties. Employers should work with legal counsel to ensure noncompetes clearly identify the parties, satisfy applicable legal requirements, and are appropriately tailored before seeking enforcement.

 


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

Missouri

Missouri: Court Clarifies Application of EFAA

APPLIES TO

All Employers with Employees in MO

EFFECTIVE

AUG 11, 2026

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • A plaintiff does not have to make a specific sexual harassment claim to be covered under the EFAA; a dispute is sufficient.
  • The time to determine when a dispute arose is measured when the two sides actually take opposing positions, not necessarily when the activity took place.

Discussion

In State ex rel. Waddell v. Atkins, the Missouri Court of Appeals enforced the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA), which says that a person alleging sexual assault or harassment can choose to go to court instead of arbitration, as long as the arbitration agreement was signed before the dispute arose. Specifically, a plaintiff does not have to make a specific sexual harassment claim to be covered, and the time to determine when a dispute arose is measured when the two sides actually take opposing positions.

 

An employee worked as a housekeeper at a Missouri nursing home. In early 2023, his supervisor promoted him and then allegedly sexually assaulted and harassed him several times. The employee reported the alleged misconduct and was fired in April 2023, supposedly for missing shifts. After the company looked into his complaint, it rehired him at a facility in Topeka and promised he would never have to see or talk to his former supervisor. As part of the online rehiring process, he had to sign a broad arbitration agreement. The company later told him he had to attend a managers’ lunch that the former supervisor would be at or be fired. The employee resigned in July 2023. In April 2025, he sued for defamation, tortious interference, wrongful discharge, and violation of a Kansas law.

 

The employer attempted to enforce the arbitration agreement signed on rehire. The trial court agreed and paused the lawsuit, and the employee appealed. The court said the EFAA applies even though none of the employee’s legal claims were labeled “sexual harassment.” The law covers sexual assault and harassment disputes, not specific claims, and the employee’s case is rooted in the alleged abuse and how his employer responded. The court also said the law protects the whole case, not just some of the claims.

There was also an issue concerning when the dispute arose. The employer argued the dispute began when the abuse happened, or at least when the employee reported it, which would make the arbitration agreement “post-dispute” and enforceable. The court disagreed, finding that a dispute begins when the two sides actually take opposing positions. When the employee was rehired, both sides seemed satisfied with how the complaint had been handled. The dispute only started later, when the employer broke its promise about the supervisor. This made the agreement “pre-dispute,” so it could not be enforced.

 

Ultimately, the court denied the motion to compel arbitration and let the lawsuit go forward in court. The ruling sends a clear message to employers: a general arbitration agreement signed while a harassment complaint is being handled may not be enforceable under the EFAA. The court explained that the law’s purpose is to make sure workers agree to arbitrate harassment claims only when they know about a specific dispute and choose arbitration for it on equal footing.

 

Action Items

 

  1. Review arbitration agreements with legal counsel for compliance.

 


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase