NLRB Updates

Discussion

NLRB Issues New Memos Narrowing NLRA Interpretation

APPLIES TO

All Employers Subject to the NLRA

EFFECTIVE

JUN 26, 2026

QUESTIONS?

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Quick Look

  • Employee nonsolicitation agreements and cooperation agreements that only apply after employment ends do not violate the NLRA.
  • Noncompetition agreements  generally do not implicate NLRA rights, and confidentiality provisions are typically read as protecting legitimate business interests rather than restricting protected activity.
  • Even where certain nonsolicitation, inducement-of-third-parties, and non-disparagement provisions were technically unlawful, the claim was dismissed because the employer never actually enforced them against employees.

Discussion

On June 26, 2026, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) released several advice memoranda addressing when employer agreements and workplace conduct fall within the protections of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Advice memos are guidance issued by the NLRB General Counsel’s office to regional offices. Although they are not binding Board decisions, they do offer useful insight into how the agency is currently interpreting the law and periodizing enforcement.

 

Across the memos, the NLRB drew a consistent distinction: activity or contract language that only takes effect after employment ends generally does not restrict protected activity under the NLRA. The NLRB also confirmed that even where a contract provision is technically unlawful, a violation will not be found if the employer never enforced that provision against employees. Each memo is summarized below.

 

Nonsolicitation and Cooperation Clauses. In BAYADA Home Health Care, the NLRB reviewed a nonsolicitation-of-employees clause and a cooperation clause contained in a separation agreement. The NLRB found the nonsolicitation clause lawful under the McLaren Macomb standard (the current framework the Board uses to evaluate whether severance agreement terms unlawfully restrict NLRA rights) because it appeared in a separation agreement and applied only after employment ended, meaning it did not restrict any protected activity during employment. The NLRB also found the cooperation clause lawful. That clause required the former employee to assist with the employer’s legal or investigative matters. The NLRB reasoned that: (1) no prior precedent has held this type of clause unlawful; (2) any related questioning would occur after employment ended, when NLRA protections no longer apply; and (3) the clause was reasonably limited to matters like providing information or attending meetings, rather than compelling testimony against coworkers.

 

Noncompete and Confidentiality Provisions. In Biotricity, Inc., the NLRB reviewed a noncompete agreement, along with a related state-court lawsuit and arbitration proceeding brought in part to enforce that agreement. The NLRB found the noncompete and confidentiality provisions lawful, reasoning that noncompete clauses generally do not affect employees’ rights under Section 7 of the NLRA, and that the confidentiality clause would reasonably be understood as protecting the employer’s competitive business interests rather than restricting employees’ protected communications. As for the nonsolicitation, inducement-of-third-parties, and non-disparagement provisions, the NLRB said that even though portions of the provisions were unlawful, the claim should be dismissed on ”noneffectuation grounds,” meaning that because the employer never actually enforced these provisions against employees, there was no practical harm for the Board to remedy. As for the related lawsuit and arbitration, the NLRB found no NLRA violation, concluding the legal actions were not retaliatory, lacked any unlawful objective, and did not conflict with the NLRA because no protected activity was actually at issue in the underlying claims.

 

Overtime Policy Change and Termination for Recording a Meeting. In Sutherland Global Services, the NLRB considered both a change to the employer’s overtime policy, and a termination following an employee’s secret recording of a meeting with a supervisor. The NLRB found insufficient evidence of an NLRA violation in either instance. On the overtime policy, the NLRB acknowledged that the employee’s escalation of concerns about unpaid wages could arguably be tied to earlier protected group activity. However, there was not enough evidence to show the employer knew the complaint was raised on behalf of a group of employees, or that the policy change was made in retaliation. On the termination, the NLRB found insufficient evidence that the secret recording itself qualified as protected concerted activity. The employer stated it terminated the employee for violating its Clean Desk Policy, which requires personal items such as cell phones to be stored away to protect client confidential information.

 

While these rulings shed light on the NLRB’s interpretation of NLRA protections and enforcement strategy, employers must still take care when managing employee agreements and policies as they may be subject to more restrictive state laws. For any adverse employment activity that may implicate NLRA rights, employers should consult with legal counsel for compliance.

 

Action Items

  1. Review employment agreements with legal counsel for compliance.

Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

Mid-Year PFML Updates

Discussion

Mid-Year Paid Family and Medical Leave Updates

APPLIES TO

Employers with Employees in CO, DC, ME, OR, RI and WA

EFFECTIVE

As Indicated

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • Several states have released mid-year updates to their paid family and medical leave programs, including revised state average weekly wages and maximum weekly benefit amounts.

Discussion

As is typical each year, several state paid family and medical leave (PFML) programs are rolling out mid-year updates to their state average weekly wage (SAWW) figures and corresponding maximum weekly benefit amounts. These figures directly affect how much employees may receive when taking PFML leave, and the timing and scope of the changes vary by jurisdiction. Key updates are summarized below.

 

Jurisdiction Effective Date SAWW Maximum Weekly Benefit
Colorado FAMLI July 1, 2026 $1,608.91 (from $1,534.94) $1,448.02 (from $1,381.45)
District of Columbia PFL October 1, 2026 (expected) __ TBD increase (from $1,190), tied to July 1, 2026 minimum wage increase to $18.40
Maine PFML July 1, 2026 $1,249.12 (from $1,198.84) $1,249.12 (from $1,198.84), for new claims on/after July 1, 2026
Paid Leave Oregon June 28, 2026 $1,410.13 (from $1,363.80) $1,692.16 (from $1,636.56), for new claims on/after June 28, 2026
Rhode Island TDI/TCI July 1, 2026 $1,352.74 (from $1,297.06) $1,150 (from $1,103); up to $1,552 with maximum dependency allowances (from $1,489), for new claims on/after July 1, 2026
Washington PFML July 1, 2026 (SAWW) $1,919 (from $1,830) $1,727 (from $1,647), for new claims on/after January 1, 2027

 

Employers with employees in these jurisdictions should ensure payroll and benefits teams are aware of the updated figures, particularly to the extent employer contribution obligations or employee notices reference these amounts.

 

Action Items

  1. Update payroll and leave administration systems to reflect new benefit figures, as applicable.
  2. Review employee notices and postings referencing benefit amounts for needed updates.
  3. Have appropriate personnel trained on applicable PFML program requirements.

 

 

 

 

 


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

Immigration Updates

Discussion

Supreme Court Rules on Several Immigration Matters

APPLIES TO

All Employers

EFFECTIVE

As Indicated

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • The INA allows border officers to “parole” a returning lawful permanent resident upon returning to the U.S., rather than admitting them outright if there is a pending charge of an inadmissible offense.
  • The Department of Homeland Security is permitted to end Temporary Protected Status for foreign nationals from Haiti and Syria.
  • The automatic grant of birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment is reaffirmed.

Discussion

Within an eight-day span, the U.S. Supreme Court issued three significant immigration rulings addressing lawful permanent resident reentry rights, humanitarian protections, and citizenship. Some of these rulings have immediate impacts on employers.

 

Lawful Permanent Residents Suspected of Committing Offenses May Be Paroled at Reentry

 

On June 23, 2026, in Blanche v. Lau, the Court ruled the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows border officers to “parole” a returning lawful permanent resident (LPR) upon returning to the U.S. rather than admitting them outright if there is a pending charge of an inadmissible offense. Parole allows a noncitizen to physically enter and be present in the U.S. without formal admission under the INA. They are then still treated legally as if they are still at the border, which creates a lower threshold for removal from the U.S.

 

In this case, an LPR had a pending charge of trademark counterfeiting. He traveled abroad while the charge was pending, and when he returned to the U.S., he was not admitted but instead paroled based on the pending charge. After he pled guilty to the charge, his status was changed to inadmissible with a removal order.

 

In its ruling, the Court found that the INA does not impose a clear-and-convincing evidence requirement for border officers. It looks only to the commission of a crime, not conviction. The Court also noted that border officers must make “quick judgments on the spot,” which further weighs against imposing a heightened evidentiary burden. In this case, the pending charge involved moral turpitude, which can independently serve as a basis for inadmissibility.

 

Employers with LPRs who have pending charges may wish to consult immigration legal counsel before those workers depart on international travel. Reentry now carries greater risk and could lead to unexpected operational disruptions if an employee is paroled or found inadmissible upon return.

 

End of TPS Benefits for Haiti and Syria

 

On June 25, 2026, in Mullin v. Doe, the Court ruled that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) could end Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for foreign nationals from Haiti and Syria. TPS allows DHS to designate foreign nationals as eligible to remain and work in the U.S. when conditions in their home country make it unsafe for them to return (e.g., natural disasters, armed conflict, or other extraordinary and temporary circumstances). Haiti and Syria had previously met these conditions. However, in 2025, DHS determined that conditions no longer met the TPS threshold and that TPS could be terminated – Syria’s on September 22, 2025 and Haiti’s on November 28, 2025. Several TPS holders filed lawsuits that temporarily suspended the terminations pending the results of the legal challenges.

 

In reaching its ruling, the Court considered whether (1) the courts were prohibited from reviewing the DHS Secretary’s TPS termination decisions; and (2) whether the Haitian TPS holders could prove a sufficient likelihood of success on their equal protection claim that the termination was motivated by racial bias against black Haitians. The Court found that 8 U.S.C. Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) of the INA categorically bar courts from reviewing the DHS Secretary’s TPS termination decisions, including review of procedural violations, such as whether the Secretary adequately consulted the State Department about conditions in Syria and Haiti. The Court also found no racial animus against black Haitians, acknowledging that although the administration used “heated language” when referencing Haiti and Haitians, the statements were not racial and reflected policy views grounded in race-neutral considerations. The ruling sends the individual legal challenges back to the lower courts to align with the Court’s decision.

 

This ruling has immediate impacts for employers with Haitian and Syrian workers who hold TPS-based work authorization. Employers should review applicable Employment Authorization Documents (EADs) for termination dates. DHS previously stated that TPS-related work authorization extensions for Haiti and Syria would expire on July 1, 2026. However, alerts from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) on July 10, 2026 indicate different EAD expiration dates: July 17, 2026, for Syria and July 24, 2026, for Haiti. Employers should consult with immigration legal counsel to determine next steps regarding impacted workers with TPS-based work authorization.

 

Birthright Citizenship Upheld

 

On June 30, 2026, in Trump v. Barbara, the Court reaffirmed the automatic grant of birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment. The ruling struck down Executive Order 14160 which sought to limit birthright citizenship (automatic U.S. citizenship attained by virtually all children born on U.S. soil) by requiring children to have at least one parent who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident in order to obtain U.S. citizenship at birth.

 

In reaching its ruling, the Court found no support for the administration’s argument that a child’s parents must owe “primary allegiance” to, or have established domicile in, the United States. Rather, the Court pointed to a lengthy history reflecting the Fourteenth Amendment’s intent to permanently constitutionalize birthright citizenship without regard to shifting political majorities. The only narrow historical exception recognized is for children of accredited diplomats or occupying enemy forces.

 

While Justice Kavanaugh agreed with the result of invalidating the Executive Order, he relied on the argument that it violated 8 U.S.C. Section 1401(a) of the INA, which provides that a person born in the U.S. is a national and citizen of the U.S. He argued that the Executive Order did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment itself, contending the issue was less settled than the majority’s opinion suggested. He reasoned that neither precedent nor the Amendment would prevent Congress from legislating new exceptions to birthright citizenship, noting that the Amendment’s drafters could not have anticipated the modern immigration system.

 

It remains to be seen whether Congress will take up legislation to restrict birthright citizenship. The Executive Order has been blocked by multiple courts since 2025 and has never taken effect, so there is no immediate action required of employers as a result of this decision.

 

Action Items

  1. Consult with immigration legal counsel regarding expiration of TPS-based EADs and the risks of international travel for workers who are LPRs.

 

Federal Court Strikes Down Suspension of Immigration Benefit Requests

APPLIES TO

All Employers

EFFECTIVE

JUN 5, 2026

QUESTIONS?

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Quick Look

  • A federal district court struck down four USCIS policies nationwide that had suspended or delayed adjudication of immigration benefits, including asylum, adjustment of status, employment authorization, and naturalization, for nationals of countries subject to the travel ban.

Discussion

In Dorcas International Institute of Rhode Island v. USCIS, the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island ruled that four USCIS policies were unlawful and vacated them nationwide. All four policies suspended review and/or granting of immigration benefits. The policies are as follows:

 

  • Benefits Hold Policy (PM-602-0192 and PM-602-0194). Placed an indefinite hold on final adjudication of pending applications for adjustment of status, employment authorization, and naturalization for nationals of the 39 countries affected by the travel ban.
  • Global Asylum Hold Policy (PM-602-0192). Placed a hold on all pending asylum and withholding-of-removal applications regardless of the applicant’s nationality. Required a “comprehensive review” without defining the parameters.
  • Comprehensive Re-Review Policy (PM-602-0192). Directed USCIS officers to re-review previously approved benefit grants like asylum, adjustment of status, employment authorization, and naturalization for nationals of the 39 countries affected by the travel ban. This was based only on nationality and date of entry and not an individualized indicator of risk.
  • Country-Specific Factors Policy (Policy Alert PA-2025-26). Required adjudicators to consider insufficient vetting and screening information as a significant negative factor in any discretionary immigration benefit decision for nationals of the 39 countries affected by the travel ban.

 

In its ruling, the court found that the policies were contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). INA Section 212(f) grants the President power to restrict entry at the border but does not allow freezing domestic adjudication of benefits for those already present in the U.S. The INA already imposes nondiscretionary duties on USCIS to adjudicate benefits, and USCIS cannot use internal memos to override those statutory mandates.

 

The court also found that USCIS’s memos relied on only two isolated incidents, yet applied that reasoning broadly to noncitizens from the 39 affected countries, without demonstrating the reasoned decision-making required under the APA. Further undermining the stated national security rationale, USCIS had carved out exceptions for certain athletes and physicians from the affected countries, while the President and Secretary Noem had made public statements expressing hostility toward immigrants generally, which the court found inconsistent with a genuine security justification.

 

As a result of the ruling, employers with workers whose adjustment applications, EAD renewals, or other immigration benefits placed on hold may begin to see movement on processing. Employers should still exercise caution and consult with immigration legal counsel on next steps, since USCIS has not yet issued revised guidance addressing the ruling.

 

Action Items

  1. Consult with immigration legal counsel regarding work authorizations contingent upon pending USCIS processing.

 

 

Trump Administration Appeals Court Decision to End H-1B Visa Fee

On June 11, 2026, the Trump Administration filed a notice of appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeals challenging the decision to vacate Proclamation 10973 which imposed a $100,000 fee for new H-1B petitions filed for beneficiaries located outside of the U.S. The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts had struck down the fee on June 8, 2026, but the district court issued an administrative stay of its own ruling on June 12, 2026, which reinstated the fee while the government pursues relief from the First Circuit. On June 18, 2026, the government formally asked the First Circuit to extend the stay for the duration of the appeal. As a result, USCIS is currently permitted to continue collecting the $100,000 fee for qualifying H-1B petitions involving consular processing while the appeal proceeds. Employers should continue to monitor the USCIS website and consult immigration counsel, as further changes to the fee’s status are likely as the litigation continues.

 

DHS Proposes Increase to Naturalization Application Fees

On June 23, 2026, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a proposed rule to increase the application fee for naturalization applications. The paper filing fee would increase from $760 to $1,330 and online filing fees would increase from $710 to $1,280. DHS would also eliminate the $380 reduced fee option for low-income applicants and end fee waivers. Public comments to the proposed rule must be submitted on or before August 24, 2026.

 

USCIS Updates Section 5 of M-274

On July 7, 2026, USCIS updated the M-274 Handbook for Employers. Specifically, Section 5 has been updated to reflect the changes to automatic extensions of TPS and EADs as a result of federal register notices unique to certain countries, the DHS interim final rule eliminating the automatic extension period, and other changes resulting from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. Employers should be sure to review the updated Section 5 prior to reviewing and completing Form I-9.

 

OFLC Publishes List of Randomized H-2B Applications for H-2B Workers

On July 8, 2026, the Department of Labor’s Office of Foreign Labor Certification (OFLC) published a list of randomized H-2B applications submitted during the July 3-5, 2026 filing window for H-2B workers with a work start date of October 1, 2026. OFLC cited a large number of applications filed requiring cases to be split into two groups. Group A cases are being assigned to the National Processing Center for notices of Acceptance or Deficiency. Employers were notified on July 6, 2026 of the group assignment for their application.

 

USCIS Updates EAD Expiration Dates for TPS Beneficiaries

On July 10, 2026, USCIS issued an update regarding the expiration of Employment Authorization Documents (EADs) related to Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for certain countries. DHS had previously terminated TPS designations for these countries, prompting multiple lawsuits in federal district courts that temporarily blocked the terminations. While that litigation was pending, DHS initially set a placeholder EAD expiration date of July 1, 2026, which was later extended to July 10, 2026, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Mullin v. Doe upholding DHS’s authority to terminate TPS. USCIS has now removed the July 10, 2026 expiration date and established new expiration dates of July 24, 2026, for TPS-related EADs for nationals of Haiti, and July 17, 2026, for nationals of Burma, Somalia, Yemen, Syria, Ethiopia, and South Sudan. Further changes to these dates are anticipated. Employers with employees from these countries should consult immigration counsel to confirm accurate EAD expiration dates and ensure compliance with federal requirements.


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

DOL Updates

Discussion

DOL Demands State Action on Unemployment Insurance Fraud

On June 17, 2026, the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Acting Secretary of Labor issued formal letters to governors of 53 states and territories demanding immediate action to “combat fraud, waste, and abuse within their unemployment insurance (UI) programs.” The announcement cited examples such as California’s $20 billion federal debt tied to UI mismanagement, New York’s estimated $2 million in daily fraud losses, and Illinois’s more than $320 million in improper payments. Working with the Office of the Inspector General, the DOL indicated that it will use “every available enforcement tool,” including withholding administrative funds from noncompliant states for the first time, and stated that additional guidance and directives will be issued to states in the coming weeks. Employers should monitor for state-level responses that may affect UI tax rates, audits, or claims administration in their jurisdictions.

 

DOL Confirms Trump Accounts Are Not Subject to ERISA

On June 17, 2026, the DOL issued Technical Release 2026-02 confirming that employer contributions to a child’s “Trump Account” (e.g., the newly established savings accounts funded with $1,000 federal deposits for eligible children) are not subject to Title I of ERISA. Employers may contribute up to $2,500 per year tax-free to an employee’s child’s account and may facilitate employee payroll-deduction contributions, but must remain neutral toward the program (e.g., no investment influence, no endorsement, no representation that it’s an employer-sponsored benefit) to avoid inadvertently triggering ERISA coverage. Employers considering offering this as a voluntary perk should coordinate with their benefits advisor to ensure the program is structured to stay outside ERISA’s scope.

 


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

Federal Court Updates

Discussion

Third Circuit: Retaliation Standard Under ADA and FMLA

APPLIES TO

All Employers with Employees in DE, NJ, PA, and the U.S. Virgin Islands

EFFECTIVE

JUN 24, 2026

QUESTIONS?

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Quick Look

  • The Third Circuit adopted the “materially adverse” standard for retaliation claims under the ADA and FMLA, aligning with the broader standard already applied to Title VII retaliation claims.
  • Under this standard, an action is materially adverse if it could dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity, meaning it is not limited to formal changes in job status or compensation structure.

Discussion

On June 24, 2026, the Third Circuit issued a decision in Steidle v. United States Liability Insurance Co., Inc., clarifying the scope of actionable retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). In this case, an employee claimed that his employer retaliated against him for requesting FMLA leave and workplace accommodations by giving him lower-than-expected bonuses and salary increases. The district court had granted summary judgment to the employer, finding that the plaintiff had not suffered an “adverse employment action” and failed to establish causation. The Third Circuit considered whether ADA and FMLA retaliation claims are limited to traditional employment actions affecting compensation or job status, or whether they are instead governed by the broader “materially adverse” standard the U.S. Supreme Court set for Title VII retaliation claims in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White.

 

In making its decision, the court adopted the broader standard, holding that an employer’s action is materially adverse if it could dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity, such as requesting leave or an accommodation. Applying this standard, the court rejected a narrow interpretation that would have excluded discretionary compensation decisions from scrutiny, instead concluding that reduced bonuses and salary increases, particularly when closely tied in time to protected activity, may constitute actionable retaliation.

 

This decision means that compensation decisions, including discretionary bonuses and merit increases, now squarely fall within the scope of potential ADA and FMLA retaliation exposure. This ruling also emphasizes the importance of maintaining well-documented, consistent, and objective criteria for compensation decisions, particularly for employees who have recently requested leave or an accommodation.

 

Action Items

  1. Review compensation decision-making processes for consistent, objective, performance-based criteria.
  2. Consult with legal counsel when compensation decisions closely follow an employee’s leave or accommodation request.

 

Fourth Circuit: Employee Dissatisfaction with Accommodation Is Not a Failure to Accommodate

APPLIES TO

Employers with 15+ Employees in MD, NC, SC, VA, and WV

EFFECTIVE

MAR 3, 2026

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

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Quick Look

  • The ADA’s interactive process does not guarantee employees their preferred accommodation, and employee dissatisfaction with a reasonable accommodation does not amount to a failure to accommodate.
  • Employers retain the “ultimate discretion” to select an effective accommodation from among the reasonable options available; employees may not unilaterally dictate the terms of their accommodation.

Discussion

In Redding v. Noem, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a failure-to-accommodate claim brought under the Rehabilitation Act (the federal-employee analog to the ADA), reinforcing key principles that apply equally to ADA accommodation claims in the private sector.

 

In this case, the plaintiff worked as a federal air marshal for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for more than seven years. After developing certain medical conditions over time, she was placed on temporary “light duty” status. Eventually, TSA informed her that she could no longer meet the agency’s medical standards for her position and recommended she seek reassignment. In requesting reassignment, the employee herself acknowledged her “inability to perform the essential duties” of her position. With no open positions available within TSA, the employee applied for and was reassigned, at her own selection, to a position at another federal agency. After struggling in the new role, she sought reconsideration of her assignment, but TSA advised it could no longer assist her since she was no longer a TSA employee. She then sued, arguing TSA should have kept her permanently in the light-duty position.

 

The Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal on two independent grounds. First, the employee’s own admission that she could not perform the essential functions of her position meant she was not a “qualified individual” under the Rehabilitation Act/ADA framework. Second, even setting that aside, the court found TSA had provided a reasonable accommodation when it placed her on light duty, searched for vacant positions within TSA when she could no longer perform even the adjusted duties, and ultimately facilitated a reassignment to another agency.  Critically, because the employee herself had identified and selected the reassignment position, her later dissatisfaction with that choice did not retroactively make TSA’s accommodation “unreasonable.” As the court put it, the interactive process gives employees “a meaningful voice” but does not guarantee them their preferred outcome, and TSA’s accommodation obligations ended once the reassignment was completed.

 

For employers, this case emphasizes the importance of maintaining accurate documentation throughout the interactive process. This includes, but is not limited to, accommodation offers, employee responses, and reasons for rejecting or pursuing a particular accommodation option. Job descriptions should also clearly and accurately define essential functions, as courts give considerable deference to an employer’s judgment on what functions are essential to a role.

 

Action Items

  1. Review job descriptions for clear and accurately defined essential functions.
  2. Maintain accurate documentation of interactive process for all accommodation requests.
  3. Have appropriate personnel trained on ADA requirements.
  4. Consult with legal counsel when evaluating reassignment or other accommodations of last resort.

 

Eight Circuit: Vaccine Mandates Are Not “Essential Job Functions” Under the ADA

APPLIES TO

All Employers with Employees in AR, IA, MN, MO, NE, ND, and SD

EFFECTIVE

JUN 15, 2026

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • The court rejected the employer’s attempt to argue that a vaccine policy was itself an “essential job function.”
  • A vaccine exemption was found to be a form of accommodation, not an essential job function.

Discussion

In Klimek v. CentraCare Health System, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff’s ADA disability discrimination claim, based on a request for a medical exemption from a COVID-19 vaccine mandate, could move forward. Here, Klimek was a CentraCare nurse who suffered a workplace injury leading to Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy (RSD) which caused chronic pain, nausea, and vertigo. In 2016, CentraCare required all employees to receive the MMR vaccine for which Klimek applied for a medical exemption. CentraCare approved the exemption and said she was permanently exempt from live vaccinations while being treated for RSD. In 2021, Klimek then moved to a position as a clinical documentation integrity specialist which was 100% remote with no in-patient contact. That same year, CentraCare required all employees to obtain a COVID-19 vaccine absent a medical or religious exemption. Klimek requested a medical exemption like she had in the past, but CentraCare denied it without explanation – even after she submitted a letter explaining that she was 100% remote with no coworker or patient contact. CentraCare then placed Klimek on involuntary unpaid leave of absence which effectively ended her employment.

 

A lower court initially granted summary judgment in favor of CentraCare; however, the Eighth Circuit reversed. In reaching its decision, the court rejected CentraCare’s argument that its vaccine policy itself qualified as an “essential job function,” explaining that a vaccine exemption is an accommodation, not an essential function, and that treating the two as the same would run contrary to the ADA. Instead, the relevant question was whether in-person patient care was an essential function of Klimek’s job, and the court found that it was not. The court also found that CentraCare had knowledge of her disability based on her prior vaccine exemption requests and had received sufficient medical documentation to trigger the interactive process, which CentraCare failed to engage in.

 

This case serves as a reminder for healthcare employers that vaccine policies cannot be treated as an essential job function on their own, but must instead be tied to the specific duties of the role in question. It also underscores that once an employer has sufficient information indicating a disability, it must engage in the interactive process in good faith.

 

Action Items

  1. Review vaccine policies and practices for compliance with medical and religious exemptions.
  2. Review procedures for engaging in the interactive process when the need for a medical accommodation is known.
  3. Have appropriate personnel trained on workplace accommodation requirements.

 

Ninth Circuit: Compelling Arbitration

APPLIES TO

All Employers with Employees in AK, AZ, CA, HI, ID, MT, NV, OR, WA, Guam, and Northern Mariana Islands

EFFECTIVE

JUN 9, 2026

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

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Quick Look

  • The court, not the arbitrator, must determine whether the FAA, or any exceptions, apply to arbitration agreements before compelling arbitration.

Discussion

In Orr v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the Ninth Circuit said the district court erred by compelling arbitration of an employee’s individual claims without specifying the source of its authority to do so. Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court previously held in New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira that the district court, not an arbitrator, must decide whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies to an agreement before ordering arbitration.

 

Here, an employer sought to compel arbitration of a former employee’s claims filed in court. The district court said that the employee’s claims must proceed to arbitration regardless of the applicable law, so the court did not need to determine whether the federal or state arbitration law applies. In ordering the claim to arbitration without further ruling, it would have left the determination of applicable arbitration law to the arbitrator.

 

The Ninth Circuit reiterated New Prime’s instruction to courts to determine the basis of their authority to compel claims to arbitration, which was not done here. Additionally, the arbitration agreement at issue selected the FAA as controlling law unless the FAA “does not apply to a particular dispute or to one or both parties.” To enforce the agreement by its terms, the district court had to decide whether the FAA or state law supplied its authority to compel arbitration. Because the district court did not decide the contractual question (e.g., whether the FAA is applicable) the arbitrator would need to, which New Prime forbids.

 

Action Items

  1. Review arbitration agreements with legal counsel for compliance.

Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

Other Federal Agency Updates

Discussion

SCOTUS Expands Presidential Power to Fire Members of Independent Agencies

APPLIES TO

All Employers

EFFECTIVE

JUN 26, 2026

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that statutory removal protections for FTC Commissioners violate the separation of powers, holding that the President may remove such subordinates at will.
  • While the case directly addressed only the FTC, the ruling has significant implications for other independent agencies with similar removal protections, including the NLRB and EEOC.

Discussion

On June 26, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in Trump v. Slaughter, substantially expanding presidential authority to remove members of independent federal agencies. While the case centered on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the ruling’s implications extend far beyond that agency, with likely consequences for other independent agencies critical to the workplace, including the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

 

As background, in 2025, President Trump fired two Democratic FTC Commissioners without articulating cause. One of them, former Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, challenged her termination as unlawful and was reinstated by a federal district court. The Trump administration appealed, arguing that the FTC Act’s statutory removal protections were unconstitutional. Those protections allow commissioners to be removed only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance,” and had been upheld as constitutional in the Supreme Court’s 1935 decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States. The Humphrey’s Executor case had determined that FTC commissioners performed “quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative” duties that placed them beyond the President’s unilateral removal power.

 

Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court held that the FTC Act’s removal protections violate the separation of powers and that the President may remove his subordinates at will. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts explained that today’s FTC “performs tasks that fall well within the heartland of executive power” and enforces around 80 federal laws central to the U.S. economy. The Court concluded that subordinates who exercise the President’s power must remain accountable to the President in order for the President to remain accountable to the people. In reaching this conclusion, the majority overruled Humphrey’s Executor, finding it tethered to an outdated and “almost fictional” view of the FTC’s role.

 

Although Trump v. Slaughter directly concerned the FTC, the overruling of Humphrey’s Executor is expected to have ripple effects across other independent agencies with similar for-cause removal protections, particularly the NLRB and EEOC. Employers should anticipate that the FTC, NLRB, and EEOC may become more directly responsive to the sitting administration’s policy priorities going forward, with enforcement approaches potentially shifting more significantly between administrations. This is particularly relevant given the FTC’s expanding role in employment-related issues such as noncompetes, labor market antitrust concerns, worker classification, and employee data privacy.

 

Action Items

  1. Monitor developments regarding the composition and enforcement priorities of the FTC, NLRB, and EEOC.
  2. Consult with legal counsel regarding pending matters before the NLRB or EEOC, in light of the agencies’ evolving structural posture.

 

EEOC Rescinds Guidance on Permissible Affirmative Action

APPLIES TO

All Employers

EFFECTIVE

JUN 30, 2026

QUESTIONS?

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Quick Look

  • The EEOC rescinded its regulatory guidelines on “appropriate” affirmative action under Title VII, as well as Section 607 of its Compliance Manual addressing those guidelines.
  • The rescission eliminates employers’ ability to rely on the Section 713(b)(1) good-faith reliance defense with respect to this guidance.
  • The rescission does not overturn existing Supreme Court precedent recognizing that Title VII may permit certain voluntary affirmative action plans in limited circumstances, but it signals continued scrutiny of race- and sex-conscious employment practices.

Discussion

On June 30, 2026, the EEOC announced that it had rescinded two documents relating to permissible affirmative action under Title VII: (1) its regulatory guidelines on “appropriate” affirmative action, and (2) Section 607 of its Compliance Manual, which addressed those guidelines and the agency’s enforcement position on affirmative action plans.

 

The rescinded guidance had explained that voluntary affirmative action plans were only lawful under federal EEO law when designed to remedy past or present discrimination, or to address manifest imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories, and only if narrowly tailored, temporary, flexible, and structured to avoid unnecessarily disadvantaging non-beneficiaries. Perhaps most significantly, the guidance provided a safe harbor under Section 713(b)(1) of the Civil Rights Act, allowing employers to defend against an unlawful employment practice claim by demonstrating good-faith reliance on the EEOC’s written guidance. With this rescission, that defense is no longer available to employers relying on the now-rescinded documents.

 

Importantly, the rescission does not overturn the Supreme Court’s decisions in United Steelworkers v. Weber (1979) and Johnson v. Transportation Agency (1987), which recognized that Title VII may permit certain voluntary affirmative action plans in limited circumstances. Whether those precedents remain good law is a question only the Supreme Court can resolve, notwithstanding the EEOC’s position that rescission is “consistent with the text of Title VII and Supreme Court precedent.” Nonetheless, this action is consistent with other recent EEOC and Trump administration efforts to scrutinize the consideration of race and sex in employment decision-making.

 

Action Items

  1. Review existing voluntary affirmative action plans and practices with legal counsel.
  2. Continue to monitor related EEOC guidance affecting affirmative action and DEI-related practices.
  3. Have appropriate personnel trained on updated compliance obligations.

 

 

DOJ Opinion Letter on EEOC Disparate Impact Guidelines

On June 9, 2026, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel issued an opinion concluding that the EEOC’s disparate-impact liability guidelines under Title VII are unconstitutional, finding they improperly pressured employers to engage in racial discrimination. The opinion, which implements Executive Order 14281, clarifies that employers may use job-related hiring practices (such as aptitude tests, background checks, and standardized test scores) without fear of Title VII liability simply because they produce different outcomes across demographic groups, so long as the practice is reasonable or serves a valid business purpose. The opinion also raises the bar for disparate-impact plaintiffs, who must now show both that a specific practice directly caused the unequal outcome and that an equally effective, less discriminatory alternative exists. Employers should be aware that this is a DOJ/EEOC interpretive opinion rather than a change in the text of Title VII itself, and that state-level disparate impact protections remain unaffected.

 

New “Faster Labor Contracts Act” Advances to Senate

On June 9, 2026, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Faster Labor Contracts Act (HR 5408), which would significantly accelerate first-contract bargaining timelines by requiring employers to begin negotiations within 10 days of union certification, imposing a 90-day bargaining period, and mandating mediation followed by binding interest arbitration if the parties fail to reach agreement. The bill now moves to the Senate, where it will likely need 60 votes to overcome a filibuster. Because this legislation remains pending, employers should monitor its progress for now.

 

ILO Adopts a Convention Governing Platform Workers

On June 12, 2026, the International Labour Organization (ILO) (the tripartite U.N. agency that brings together governments, employers, and workers from 187 member states to set international labor standards) voted to adopt the “Decent Work in the Platform Economy Convention,” establishing an international framework for laws governing digital platform work, including minimum wage guarantees, protections against unlawful termination, and rights related to automated management and data protection. The United States was among eight countries voting no, and the Convention is unlikely to be ratified domestically, though it is expected to be ratified by numerous other member countries, including several in the European Union. U.S. employers with international operations should monitor ratification developments in the countries where they operate.

 

Senate Committee Advances NO FAKES Act to Protect Against Unauthorized AI Likeness Use

On June 18, 2026, the Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously advanced the NO FAKES Act (S. 4591), which would create a new federal intellectual property right allowing individuals to control the use of AI-generated “digital replicas” of their voice or likeness, and would establish a notice-and-takedown process for unauthorized use. The bill now heads to the full Senate, with a companion bill still pending in the House. Employers, particularly those in media, entertainment, marketing, or that use AI tools involving employee or public likenesses, should monitor its progress.

 

EPA Aligns with OSHA 2024 Hazard Communications Standard

On June 22, 2026, the EPA finalized a rule aligning its Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) hazardous chemical inventory reporting categories with OSHA’s 2024 Hazard Communication Standard, allowing facilities to use their OSHA-compliant safety data sheet (SDS) hazard classifications directly for EPCRA Tier I/Tier II reporting rather than maintaining separate categorization systems. The rule takes effect August 21, 2026, but facilities have until January 1, 2028 to come into compliance. Core EPCRA obligations (SDS/chemical list submissions, annual inventory reporting, and the March 1 Tier II deadline) remain unchanged. Facilities with hazardous chemical inventories should begin reviewing SDS classifications, updating reporting workflows and software, refreshing written EPCRA procedures, and coordinating with state/local emergency planning authorities ahead of the compliance deadline.


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

Alabama

Discussion

Alabama: New Hiring Preferences for Veterans and Their Spouses

Effective January 1, 2027, HB 307 allows private employers to voluntarily adopt hiring and promotion preference policies for veterans, spouses of veterans, and spouses of active-duty service members. An active-duty service member is defined as on active duty as a member of the National Guard or a reserve or active component of the Armed Forces of the United States. A veteran is an individual who has ever served in the National Guard or a reserve or active component of the Armed Forces of the United States and has been honorable discharged. All preferential policies must be in writing and uniformly applied.

 


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

Arizona

Discussion

Arizona: Updates for Independent Contractors and Military Leave Protections

APPLIES TO

All Employers with Employees in AZ

EFFECTIVE

SEP 12, 2026

QUESTIONS?

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Quick Look

  • Independent contractor agreements must have specific termination language.
  • A new law broadens military leave protections to cover any active duty or training under competent military orders, not just specific activities like camps, maneuvers, formations, or armory drills.

Discussion

The Arizona legislature passed two new laws affecting employers. The first expands independent contractor agreement requirements, and the second clarifies military leave use and protections.

 

Independent Contractors. HB 2310 amends existing law governing when “qualified marketplace contractors” (e.g., people who use a digital platform to provide services to customers) are treated as independent contractors rather than employees for purposes like unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation. Specifically, a written contract with an independent contractor must say that the contract may be terminated without cause at any time and on reasonable notice where the contract expressly provides for termination by either party to the contract or may be terminated unilaterally by a qualified marketplace contractor at any time on reasonable notice given to the other party.

 

Military Leave. HB 2663 amends state military duty leave to clarify that leave may be used for active military duty or any training, not necessary just to attend camps, maneuvers, formations or armory drills. The bill also eliminates the distinction in protections between called to duty or training, referring instead simply to being under “competent military orders” as the trigger for protection.

 

Action Items

  1. Have independent contractor agreements updated by legal counsel.
  2. Update military leave policies for compliance.
  3. Have appropriate personnel trained on the requirements.

 


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

California

Discussion

California: Court Discretion to Reduce PAGA Penalties

APPLIES TO

All Employers with Employees in CA

EFFECTIVE

JUL 1, 2026

QUESTIONS?

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(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • A court has discretion to reduce PAGA penalties; there is no statutory method for reducing a maximum civil penalty.

Discussion

In Taduran v. Glidewell, the California Court of Appeals said that the trial court has discretion to reduce Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) penalties. The Labor Code does not mandate any particular method for reducing a maximum civil penalty.

 

In this case, an employee sued his former employer for a series of Labor Code violations, resulting in a finding of liability against the employer. Although the theoretical maximum PAGA penalties totaled tens of millions of dollars, the trial court exercised its statutory discretion to reduce the penalties, ultimately awarding about $516,000. It calculated most reductions on a per-employee basis (except the bonus pay issue, where it imposed the full penalty), reasoning that imposing the maximum would be “unjust, arbitrary, and oppressive” given factors like the lack of actual unpaid wages on some claims, the employer’s good-faith practices, and its willingness to correct the problems and repay affected workers.

 

On appeal, the employee argued that the trial court was legally required to reduce penalties on a per-pay-period basis rather than a per-employee basis. The appellate court rejected this, holding that the Labor Code simply authorizes a “lesser amount” without mandating any particular reduction formula. While the maximum penalty is initially calculated per pay period, nothing in the statute dictates how the court must apply a reduction, meaning a court may reasonably use a percentage, per-pay-period, or per-employee method. Ultimately, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in either the method used or the size of the reduction.

 

While this ruling may give hope to employers looking for a reduced penalty, the case still highlights the need to maintain good-faith practices to pay wages appropriately and promptly correct any errors. Having policies and practices that support a compliant culture can go a long way, even when errors are found.

 

Action Items

  1. Review wage and hour policies and practices for compliance.
  2. Implement a regular audit schedule to verify wage and hour compliance.
  3. Consult with legal counsel when implementing wage and hour corrections.
  4. Have appropriate personnel trained on applicable wage and hour requirements.

 

California: Federal FAA Exceptions Adopted

APPLIES TO

All Employers with Employees in CA

EFFECTIVE

JAN 1, 2027

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • A new law adopts exclusions to arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) into the California Code.

Discussion

AB 2155 adopts exclusions to arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) into the California Code. The FAA specifically excludes contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce, and the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (9 U.S.C. Sec. 401 et seq.), including claims that relate to a sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute. These exclusions cannot be forced to arbitration, even with a signed agreement.

 

By adopting the FAA’s exclusions into California law, it closes a previously existing loophole where some claims could not be forced to arbitration under federal law but may be compelled under state law. Employers with employees who may be in the excluded class should review arbitration agreements with legal counsel to determine whether they will still be enforceable. Similarly, such employers may need to rethink their arbitration strategy altogether.

 

Action Items

  1. Have arbitration agreements reviewed by legal counsel.

 

California: FMCSA Preempts Meal and Rest Requirements for Passenger-Carrying Drivers

APPLIES TO

All Employers with Employees in CA

EFFECTIVE

JUN 4, 2026

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • State meal and rest requirements for passenger-carrying drivers are preempted by the FMCSA.

Discussion

In California v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the State of California challenged a 2020 decision by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) that preempted California’s meal and rest break (MRB) rules as applied to drivers of passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicles (such as buses). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied California’s petition for review and upheld the preemption. Under the Motor Carrier Safety Act, the Secretary of Transportation reviews state commercial-vehicle safety laws and may preempt any that are “additional to or more stringent than” federal regulations if the state law provides no safety benefit, is incompatible with federal rules, or imposes an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.

 

California’s MRB rules, contained in state wage orders, require a 30-minute meal period for shifts over five hours (plus a second meal period for shifts over ten hours), along with a 10-minute rest break for every four hours worked, and penalty pay for noncompliance. These requirements are more demanding than the federal hours-of-service (HOS) regulations, which cap consecutive driving and on-duty hours for bus drivers but, unlike the rules for freight drivers, do not mandate a mid-shift 30-minute break.

 

In 2020, the FMCSA determined that California’s MRB rules were preempted by federal law. The agency found that the rules qualified as regulations “on commercial motor vehicle safety” and were more stringent than the federal HOS rules. It further concluded that the MRB rules provided no measurable safety benefit beyond the federal framework, and could even create unsafe conditions when drivers struggle to find safe parking to comply. The FMCSA also found the rules incompatible with the flexibility built into the federal framework, and that they imposed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce by creating a “patchwork” of differing state requirements.

 

Reviewing the agency’s decision under the deferential arbitrary-and-capricious standard of the Administrative Procedure Act, the court found that its earlier decision in International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 2785 v. FMCSA (2021) (which upheld the FMCSA’s parallel 2018 preemption of California’s MRB rules for freight drivers) largely foreclosed California’s arguments. The court rejected California’s contention that the rules fell outside the FMCSA’s authority because they are laws of general applicability rather than being “specifically directed at” commercial motor vehicle safety, explaining that Teamsters had already held such rules qualify when they cover the same subject matter as existing federal regulation.

 

The court also rejected California’s narrower argument that the FMCSA could not preempt mid-shift break rules for bus drivers because the agency had not itself promulgated specific break regulations for passenger-carrying vehicles—holding that California read Teamsters too narrowly, since the MRB rules fall within the FMCSA’s regulatory domain and the same subject matter is already federally regulated. Finally, the court found the FMCSA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in concluding the rules imposed a significant operational burden on interstate commerce, which alone was sufficient to justify preemption. Accordingly, the panel denied the petition and upheld the FMCSA’s preemption determination.

 

Action Items

  1. Have meal and rest policies reviewed and updated for compliance.
  2. Have appropriate personnel trained on the requirements.

California: New CRD Fact Sheet

On May 20, 2026, California’s Civil Rights Department (CRD) issued a new fact sheet on religious discrimination and workplace accommodations. Governed by the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2012 (WRFA), California’s protections extend beyond federal Title VII, covering interns and volunteers in addition to employees, and reaching both perceived religious beliefs and associational discrimination (adverse treatment based on a connection to someone of a particular faith). Unlawful conduct can include hostile work environment harassment, religious stereotyping, discriminatory dress and grooming policies, and retaliation against employees who raise faith-based objections or accommodation requests. Employers with California employees should review religious accommodation policies and train managers on these broader protections.

 

California: Documentation Defeats Alleged Protected Activity

On June 26, 2026, in Han v. Pfizer, a federal district court said that historical documentation supporting an employer’s decision to terminate within two months of an employee making an alleged whistleblowing claim showed the legitimate, independent reasons for termination. Specifically, the employer had long documented the employee’s performance issues, given weekly negative feedback on performance, and was in process of preparing a notice of underperformance. The documentation showed that the employer would have terminated the employee even if he had not engaged in the alleged whistleblowing. This case highlights the need for consistent performance documentation to support legitimate business decisions, including but not limited to, employee terminations.


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

Colorado

Discussion

Colorado: Legislative Updates

APPLIES TO

As Indicated

EFFECTIVE

As Indicated

QUESTIONS?

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Quick Look

  • Employers are prohibited from holding individuals’ original ID documents for longer than 10 hours and must provide a notice of rights for signature.
  • CADA added definitions for “assistance animal” and “emotional support animal.”
  • Starting July 1, 2027, EEO-1 covered employers will need to submit their EEO-1 reports to the state.

Discussion

The Colorado legislature recently enacted three bills impacting employers: adding to CADA’s definitions;  implementing state-mandated EEO reporting for 2026; and prohibiting employers from retaining ID documents for longer than 10 hours.

 

ID Protections. As of June 3, 2026, HB 1283 immediately prohibits employers from retaining an applicant or employee’s government-issued identification documents (ID) (e.g., state-issued driver’s license, passports, or other government-issued documents) for longer than 10 hours. Primarily, retention of ID’s are permitted for purposes of verifying work authorization when completing Form I-9, including to make a copy of the ID. Copies of ID’s may be retained in an employer’s records. ID’s may also be requested and retained for any other purpose when required or permitted by state or federal law or regulation, or when performed pursuant to a signed judicial warrant.

 

Employers are required to immediately begin providing applicants and employees with notice of their rights under this bill and the person must acknowledge receipt of the notice at the time the employer is verifying their work authorization eligibility.  A violation of this new rule causes criminal and civil liability for employers. Violations will also be considered bias-motivated crimes. Additionally, it is a bias-motivated crime to provide, or threaten to provide, an individual’s ID to federal immigration authorities, except where otherwise permitted or required under state or federal law.

 

CADA Definitions. Effective August 12, 2026, HB 1045 amends the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) by adding two definitions. “Assistance animal” means an animal that does work, performs tasks, assists, or provides therapeutic emotional support to an individual with a disability, and includes an emotional support animal and a service animal. “Emotional support animal” means an animal that provides solely emotional support to an individual to alleviate a symptom or an effect of a disability.

 

State EEO Reporting. Effective July 1, 2027, under HB 1207, private employers who normally report EEO-1 data will be required to submit their reports to the Secretary of State. The same rules as apply to EEO-1 reporting as it existed on March 1, 2026 apply to Colorado, even if the federal EEO-1 reporting is repealed or discontinued.

 

Action Items

  1. Provide employees with notice of rights on ID retention for signature.
  2. Prepare to submit 2026 EEO-1 reporting to the state in 2027.
  3. Have appropriate personnel trained on updated requirements.

 

Colorado: FAMLI Updates

APPLIES TO

All Employers with Employees in CO

EFFECTIVE

JUL 1, 2026

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • FAMLI rules were amended to define qualifying absences and revise reconsideration rules on appeal.

Discussion

As of July 1, 2026, the Colorado Family and Medical Leave Insurance Act (FAMLI) revised its rules (7 CCR 1107-3) to describe qualifying absences for which benefits may be paid. An absence is caused by a qualifying condition only if it would not have occurred but for the qualifying condition, except for holiday absences covered during continuous leave. This revision helps clarify the types of absences that qualify individuals for benefits.

 

The FAMLI appeals rules (7 CCR 1107-9) were also amended. Specifically, FAMLI benefits are not owed if a party files a motion to reconsider within five business days after a hearing officer reverses or modifies the denial of a FAMLI claim. A hearing officer may also reconsider their own ruling within five days (rather than 14 days) of issuance. If an individual is owed benefits as a result, they must be paid within five business days of resolution of a motion to reconsider.

 

Action Items

  1. Update leave policies, as applicable.
  2. Have appropriate personnel trained on FAMLI requirements.

 

Colorado: Self-Defense Exception to At-Will Employment

APPLIES TO

All Employers with Employees in CO

EFFECTIVE

JUN 15, 2026

QUESTIONS?

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Quick Look

  • Self-defense is an exception to the at-will employment doctrine that allows a wrongful termination claim for being terminated for engaging in legal self-defense.

Discussion

In Moreno v. Circle K Stores, the Colorado Supreme Court answered a question certified to it from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado: whether Colorado law recognizes a public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine allowing a wrongful-termination claim when an employee is fired for acting in self-defense.

 

Here, a 72-year-old employee was confronted during her shift by a man who picked up two hunting knives and walked around the counter toward her after demanding free cigarettes. The employee extended her arms to keep him back; the assailant grabbed cigarettes, left, and was later arrested for armed robbery. The employer fired the employee for violating its “Don’t Chase or Confront” policy, which instructs employees not to “confront[,] follow, pursue, track, chase, fight[,] or follow” any customer suspected of shoplifting. The employee sued for wrongful discharge in violation of Colorado public policy.

 

The Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that Colorado recognizes a self-defense public-policy exception to at-will employment. The Court focused on whether self-defense is a “clearly expressed” right that an employee holds as a worker. It concluded that both the state’s self-defense statute and Colorado Constitution clearly express the boundaries of the right through explicit language and an extensive body of case law. The Court further found that self-defense is an “essential, inalienable right” belonging to all people (making it a public right rather than a merely personal or proprietary one) and that it is “job-related” because the need to defend oneself from an unprovoked attack can arise anywhere, including at work.

 

The Court emphasized that the exception it recognized is narrow, meaning it is limited to self-defense as an inalienable right and applies only when an employee lawfully exercises that right in response to an unprovoked attack at work. The Court was also careful to clarify what the case was not deciding. It expressed no opinion on whether the employer’s policy actually barred self-defense or merely prohibited confronting shoplifters, nor on whether the employee actually acted in self-defense or whether the employer fired her for that reason, which remain disputed factual questions.

 

Action Items

  1. Review No Confrontation policies and update as needed for compliance.
  2. Have appropriate personnel trained on requirements.

Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase