Oregon

Oregon: Workplace Safety Requirements for Behavioral Health Employers

APPLIES TO

All Behavioral Health Employers with Employees in OR

EFFECTIVE

As Indicated

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

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Quick Look

  • Behavioral health employers are required to provide safety training to new workers within 90 days of their hire and every three years thereafter.
  • Behavioral health employers that contract with the Oregon Health Authority must implement a written plan for the physical safety of their workers.

Discussion

Oregon behavioral health employers should be aware of two new workplace safety requirements. Covered employers include, but are not limited to, residential treatment facilities, sobering facilities, halfway houses, and emergency shelters providing support for individuals who have mental health disorders or substance abuse disorders.

 

Safety Training for Workers. Effective July 1, 2026, HB 2024 requires behavioral health employers to provide safety training to new workers within 90 days of their hire and every three years thereafter. The safety training must include:

 

  • The potential risks that a worker may face in the work environment of a particular behavioral health setting;
  • Protocols for using safety equipment, emergency communication devices and alert systems in emergency or crisis situations;
  • De-escalation techniques for managing and mitigating potentially aggressive behavior from clients; and
  • The available options for reporting alleged workplace safety violations and allegations of discrimination, retaliation or harassment to the Occupational Safety and Health Division of the Department of Consumer and Business Services, the Bureau of Labor and Industries and other relevant state agencies, including the rights and protections afforded to workers who engage in such reporting.

 

The training must include simulated scenarios and role-playing. Employers must also retain records documenting the completion of the training provided including the date of the training, topics covered, and the names of the workers who attended.

 

Written Safety Plan. Effective July 1, 2027, HB 4069 requires behavioral health employers that contract with the Oregon Health Authority to adopt a written plan addressing the physical safety of lone workers, meaning employees who provide or assist with behavioral health services without a colleague nearby or without close or direct supervision. The plan must cover the safety of the physical worksite, including how employees can report structural security hazards and the time frame within which the employer must respond to those reports. The plan must also describe the safety training required for covered employees.

 

Action Items

  1. Conduct required safety trainings for new workers and every three years thereafter.
  2. Maintain records of completion of required safety training.
  3. Develop and distribute a written safety plan, as applicable.

 

 

Oregon: Amended Workers’ Compensation Total Disability Benefits

For injuries occurring on or after January 1, 2027, SB 1519 provides for changes to temporary and permanent disability benefits. Temporary total disability benefits will be equal to: (1) 75% of the worker’s wage that is equal to or less than 75% of the average weekly wage in effect on the date of injury, but not less than the amount of 90% of the worker’s wage a week or the amount of $50 a week, whichever amount is less; and (2) 65% of the worker’s wage that is greater than 75% of the average weekly wage, but not more than 133% of the average weekly wage, in effect on the date of injury. Permanent total disability benefits will be equal to: (1) 75% of the worker’s wage that is equal to or less than 75% of the average weekly wage, but not less than 33% of the average weekly wage, in effect on the date of injury; and (2) 65% of the worker’s wage that is greater than 75% of the average weekly wage, but not more than 133% of the average weekly wage, in effect on the date of injury.


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania: Rest Break Activity May be Covered by Workers’ Compensation

APPLIES TO

All Employers with Employees in PA

EFFECTIVE

JUL 15, 2026

QUESTIONS?

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Quick Look

  • To determine whether an employee’s injury during a rest break is covered by workers’ compensation, the key factor isn’t whether a break is official or informal, but how much genuine free time and flexibility the worker actually had.

Discussion

In Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Baker, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court said that an employee who is injured while on a rest break may be entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. Here, a pharmacy technician at a grocery store was seriously injured when she was struck by a vehicle while crossing the street directly in front of her workplace. She was on one of her two mandatory 15-minute breaks at the time, heading to grab lunch at a nearby restaurant. The employe filed for workers’ compensation benefits, but the employer disputed the claim, arguing that she was on her own time and not doing anything work-related when she was hit, so her injury shouldn’t be covered.

 

The case bounced back and forth: a workers’ compensation judge initially sided with the employer and denied benefits, reasoning that the employee was simply on a personal errand (getting lunch) when the accident happened. However, the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board disagreed and sent the case back for reconsideration, applying a long-standing legal principle called the “personal comfort doctrine.” This doctrine holds that when an employee briefly steps away from work to tend to basic needs (like eating, smoking a cigarette, or getting a drink of water) they’re still considered to be “in the course of employment” for compensation purposes, because taking care of those basic needs is viewed as an ordinary and expected part of any job, not a break from it. On reconsideration, a different judge granted the employee’s benefits, and the Board upheld that decision.

 

The employer then appealed to the Commonwealth Court, arguing that the employee’s injury shouldn’t count because her 15-minute break was a formal, scheduled break during which she had the freedom to do whatever she wanted, unlike a quick, informal pause to grab a snack while still effectively “on duty.” Based on historical precedent, the court found that the key factor isn’t whether a break is official or informal, but how much genuine free time and flexibility the worker actually had. Because the employee’s break was so short (just 15 minutes) that she barely had time to do anything besides cross the street and grab food before having to return, the court found she didn’t have meaningful autonomy to pursue unrelated personal activities — she was essentially just tending to a basic need (hunger) in the small window she was given.

 

The court ultimately ruled in the employee’s favor, agreeing that her injury was still covered by workers’ compensation because getting food during a mandatory, brief break counts as an “act of ministration” to her personal needs rather than a true departure from work duties. The court also noted that it didn’t matter that the employee was technically jaywalking when she was hit; under workers’ compensation law, an employee’s carelessness generally doesn’t disqualify them from receiving benefits. As a result, the court affirmed the ruling awarding the employee disability benefits.

 

Action Items

  1. Review workers’ compensation claims with legal counsel before taking adverse action.

Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

South Carolina

Discussion

South Carolina: Civil Air Patrol Leave Coming Soon

Effective October 1, 2026, SB 1043 requires all employers, regardless of size, to provide civil air patrol leave to eligible employees. Eligible employees are those who are a member of the official civilian auxiliary of the United States Air Force known as the Civil Air Patrol, primarily represented within the State by the South Carolina Wing of Civil Air Patrol. Employers must provide 30 days of leave per calendar year for employees who respond to an emergency service operation of the civil air patrol and ten days of leave per calendar year for employees to engage in civil air patrol-related training. Private employers can provide paid or unpaid leave. Employers must provide leave as a lump sum at the start of each calendar year. Unused leave will be forfeited at the end of each calendar year and will not be carried over to the new calendar year. An employer may deny a request for Civil Air Patrol leave for an employee who has been designated as an essential employee. Civil Air Patrol Leave is job protected leave, and employees are also protected from retaliation and discrimination for exercising their rights under the law.


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

Vermont

Discussion

Vermont: Legal Possession Limit of Cannabis Increased

Effective July 1, 2026, Vermont increased the daily purchase limit for cannabis flower from one ounce to two ounces, with the stated goal of shifting consumers away from the illicit market and toward the state’s licensed retail marketplace. While this change does not alter existing employer obligations, employers may still maintain and enforce a drug-free workplace policy, including restrictions on the use or possession of cannabis during work hours or on company property.

 


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

NLRB Updates

Discussion

NLRB Issues New Memos Narrowing NLRA Interpretation

APPLIES TO

All Employers Subject to the NLRA

EFFECTIVE

JUN 26, 2026

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • Employee nonsolicitation agreements and cooperation agreements that only apply after employment ends do not violate the NLRA.
  • Noncompetition agreements  generally do not implicate NLRA rights, and confidentiality provisions are typically read as protecting legitimate business interests rather than restricting protected activity.
  • Even where certain nonsolicitation, inducement-of-third-parties, and non-disparagement provisions were technically unlawful, the claim was dismissed because the employer never actually enforced them against employees.

Discussion

On June 26, 2026, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) released several advice memoranda addressing when employer agreements and workplace conduct fall within the protections of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Advice memos are guidance issued by the NLRB General Counsel’s office to regional offices. Although they are not binding Board decisions, they do offer useful insight into how the agency is currently interpreting the law and periodizing enforcement.

 

Across the memos, the NLRB drew a consistent distinction: activity or contract language that only takes effect after employment ends generally does not restrict protected activity under the NLRA. The NLRB also confirmed that even where a contract provision is technically unlawful, a violation will not be found if the employer never enforced that provision against employees. Each memo is summarized below.

 

Nonsolicitation and Cooperation Clauses. In BAYADA Home Health Care, the NLRB reviewed a nonsolicitation-of-employees clause and a cooperation clause contained in a separation agreement. The NLRB found the nonsolicitation clause lawful under the McLaren Macomb standard (the current framework the Board uses to evaluate whether severance agreement terms unlawfully restrict NLRA rights) because it appeared in a separation agreement and applied only after employment ended, meaning it did not restrict any protected activity during employment. The NLRB also found the cooperation clause lawful. That clause required the former employee to assist with the employer’s legal or investigative matters. The NLRB reasoned that: (1) no prior precedent has held this type of clause unlawful; (2) any related questioning would occur after employment ended, when NLRA protections no longer apply; and (3) the clause was reasonably limited to matters like providing information or attending meetings, rather than compelling testimony against coworkers.

 

Noncompete and Confidentiality Provisions. In Biotricity, Inc., the NLRB reviewed a noncompete agreement, along with a related state-court lawsuit and arbitration proceeding brought in part to enforce that agreement. The NLRB found the noncompete and confidentiality provisions lawful, reasoning that noncompete clauses generally do not affect employees’ rights under Section 7 of the NLRA, and that the confidentiality clause would reasonably be understood as protecting the employer’s competitive business interests rather than restricting employees’ protected communications. As for the nonsolicitation, inducement-of-third-parties, and non-disparagement provisions, the NLRB said that even though portions of the provisions were unlawful, the claim should be dismissed on ”noneffectuation grounds,” meaning that because the employer never actually enforced these provisions against employees, there was no practical harm for the Board to remedy. As for the related lawsuit and arbitration, the NLRB found no NLRA violation, concluding the legal actions were not retaliatory, lacked any unlawful objective, and did not conflict with the NLRA because no protected activity was actually at issue in the underlying claims.

 

Overtime Policy Change and Termination for Recording a Meeting. In Sutherland Global Services, the NLRB considered both a change to the employer’s overtime policy, and a termination following an employee’s secret recording of a meeting with a supervisor. The NLRB found insufficient evidence of an NLRA violation in either instance. On the overtime policy, the NLRB acknowledged that the employee’s escalation of concerns about unpaid wages could arguably be tied to earlier protected group activity. However, there was not enough evidence to show the employer knew the complaint was raised on behalf of a group of employees, or that the policy change was made in retaliation. On the termination, the NLRB found insufficient evidence that the secret recording itself qualified as protected concerted activity. The employer stated it terminated the employee for violating its Clean Desk Policy, which requires personal items such as cell phones to be stored away to protect client confidential information.

 

While these rulings shed light on the NLRB’s interpretation of NLRA protections and enforcement strategy, employers must still take care when managing employee agreements and policies as they may be subject to more restrictive state laws. For any adverse employment activity that may implicate NLRA rights, employers should consult with legal counsel for compliance.

 

Action Items

  1. Review employment agreements with legal counsel for compliance.

Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

Mid-Year PFML Updates

Discussion

Mid-Year Paid Family and Medical Leave Updates

APPLIES TO

Employers with Employees in CO, DC, ME, OR, RI and WA

EFFECTIVE

As Indicated

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • Several states have released mid-year updates to their paid family and medical leave programs, including revised state average weekly wages and maximum weekly benefit amounts.

Discussion

As is typical each year, several state paid family and medical leave (PFML) programs are rolling out mid-year updates to their state average weekly wage (SAWW) figures and corresponding maximum weekly benefit amounts. These figures directly affect how much employees may receive when taking PFML leave, and the timing and scope of the changes vary by jurisdiction. Key updates are summarized below.

 

Jurisdiction Effective Date SAWW Maximum Weekly Benefit
Colorado FAMLI July 1, 2026 $1,608.91 (from $1,534.94) $1,448.02 (from $1,381.45)
District of Columbia PFL October 1, 2026 (expected) __ TBD increase (from $1,190), tied to July 1, 2026 minimum wage increase to $18.40
Maine PFML July 1, 2026 $1,249.12 (from $1,198.84) $1,249.12 (from $1,198.84), for new claims on/after July 1, 2026
Paid Leave Oregon June 28, 2026 $1,410.13 (from $1,363.80) $1,692.16 (from $1,636.56), for new claims on/after June 28, 2026
Rhode Island TDI/TCI July 1, 2026 $1,352.74 (from $1,297.06) $1,150 (from $1,103); up to $1,552 with maximum dependency allowances (from $1,489), for new claims on/after July 1, 2026
Washington PFML July 1, 2026 (SAWW) $1,919 (from $1,830) $1,727 (from $1,647), for new claims on/after January 1, 2027

 

Employers with employees in these jurisdictions should ensure payroll and benefits teams are aware of the updated figures, particularly to the extent employer contribution obligations or employee notices reference these amounts.

 

Action Items

  1. Update payroll and leave administration systems to reflect new benefit figures, as applicable.
  2. Review employee notices and postings referencing benefit amounts for needed updates.
  3. Have appropriate personnel trained on applicable PFML program requirements.

 

 

 

 

 


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

Immigration Updates

Discussion

Supreme Court Rules on Several Immigration Matters

APPLIES TO

All Employers

EFFECTIVE

As Indicated

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • The INA allows border officers to “parole” a returning lawful permanent resident upon returning to the U.S., rather than admitting them outright if there is a pending charge of an inadmissible offense.
  • The Department of Homeland Security is permitted to end Temporary Protected Status for foreign nationals from Haiti and Syria.
  • The automatic grant of birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment is reaffirmed.

Discussion

Within an eight-day span, the U.S. Supreme Court issued three significant immigration rulings addressing lawful permanent resident reentry rights, humanitarian protections, and citizenship. Some of these rulings have immediate impacts on employers.

 

Lawful Permanent Residents Suspected of Committing Offenses May Be Paroled at Reentry

 

On June 23, 2026, in Blanche v. Lau, the Court ruled the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows border officers to “parole” a returning lawful permanent resident (LPR) upon returning to the U.S. rather than admitting them outright if there is a pending charge of an inadmissible offense. Parole allows a noncitizen to physically enter and be present in the U.S. without formal admission under the INA. They are then still treated legally as if they are still at the border, which creates a lower threshold for removal from the U.S.

 

In this case, an LPR had a pending charge of trademark counterfeiting. He traveled abroad while the charge was pending, and when he returned to the U.S., he was not admitted but instead paroled based on the pending charge. After he pled guilty to the charge, his status was changed to inadmissible with a removal order.

 

In its ruling, the Court found that the INA does not impose a clear-and-convincing evidence requirement for border officers. It looks only to the commission of a crime, not conviction. The Court also noted that border officers must make “quick judgments on the spot,” which further weighs against imposing a heightened evidentiary burden. In this case, the pending charge involved moral turpitude, which can independently serve as a basis for inadmissibility.

 

Employers with LPRs who have pending charges may wish to consult immigration legal counsel before those workers depart on international travel. Reentry now carries greater risk and could lead to unexpected operational disruptions if an employee is paroled or found inadmissible upon return.

 

End of TPS Benefits for Haiti and Syria

 

On June 25, 2026, in Mullin v. Doe, the Court ruled that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) could end Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for foreign nationals from Haiti and Syria. TPS allows DHS to designate foreign nationals as eligible to remain and work in the U.S. when conditions in their home country make it unsafe for them to return (e.g., natural disasters, armed conflict, or other extraordinary and temporary circumstances). Haiti and Syria had previously met these conditions. However, in 2025, DHS determined that conditions no longer met the TPS threshold and that TPS could be terminated – Syria’s on September 22, 2025 and Haiti’s on November 28, 2025. Several TPS holders filed lawsuits that temporarily suspended the terminations pending the results of the legal challenges.

 

In reaching its ruling, the Court considered whether (1) the courts were prohibited from reviewing the DHS Secretary’s TPS termination decisions; and (2) whether the Haitian TPS holders could prove a sufficient likelihood of success on their equal protection claim that the termination was motivated by racial bias against black Haitians. The Court found that 8 U.S.C. Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) of the INA categorically bar courts from reviewing the DHS Secretary’s TPS termination decisions, including review of procedural violations, such as whether the Secretary adequately consulted the State Department about conditions in Syria and Haiti. The Court also found no racial animus against black Haitians, acknowledging that although the administration used “heated language” when referencing Haiti and Haitians, the statements were not racial and reflected policy views grounded in race-neutral considerations. The ruling sends the individual legal challenges back to the lower courts to align with the Court’s decision.

 

This ruling has immediate impacts for employers with Haitian and Syrian workers who hold TPS-based work authorization. Employers should review applicable Employment Authorization Documents (EADs) for termination dates. DHS previously stated that TPS-related work authorization extensions for Haiti and Syria would expire on July 1, 2026. However, alerts from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) on July 10, 2026 indicate different EAD expiration dates: July 17, 2026, for Syria and July 24, 2026, for Haiti. Employers should consult with immigration legal counsel to determine next steps regarding impacted workers with TPS-based work authorization.

 

Birthright Citizenship Upheld

 

On June 30, 2026, in Trump v. Barbara, the Court reaffirmed the automatic grant of birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment. The ruling struck down Executive Order 14160 which sought to limit birthright citizenship (automatic U.S. citizenship attained by virtually all children born on U.S. soil) by requiring children to have at least one parent who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident in order to obtain U.S. citizenship at birth.

 

In reaching its ruling, the Court found no support for the administration’s argument that a child’s parents must owe “primary allegiance” to, or have established domicile in, the United States. Rather, the Court pointed to a lengthy history reflecting the Fourteenth Amendment’s intent to permanently constitutionalize birthright citizenship without regard to shifting political majorities. The only narrow historical exception recognized is for children of accredited diplomats or occupying enemy forces.

 

While Justice Kavanaugh agreed with the result of invalidating the Executive Order, he relied on the argument that it violated 8 U.S.C. Section 1401(a) of the INA, which provides that a person born in the U.S. is a national and citizen of the U.S. He argued that the Executive Order did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment itself, contending the issue was less settled than the majority’s opinion suggested. He reasoned that neither precedent nor the Amendment would prevent Congress from legislating new exceptions to birthright citizenship, noting that the Amendment’s drafters could not have anticipated the modern immigration system.

 

It remains to be seen whether Congress will take up legislation to restrict birthright citizenship. The Executive Order has been blocked by multiple courts since 2025 and has never taken effect, so there is no immediate action required of employers as a result of this decision.

 

Action Items

  1. Consult with immigration legal counsel regarding expiration of TPS-based EADs and the risks of international travel for workers who are LPRs.

 

Federal Court Strikes Down Suspension of Immigration Benefit Requests

APPLIES TO

All Employers

EFFECTIVE

JUN 5, 2026

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • A federal district court struck down four USCIS policies nationwide that had suspended or delayed adjudication of immigration benefits, including asylum, adjustment of status, employment authorization, and naturalization, for nationals of countries subject to the travel ban.

Discussion

In Dorcas International Institute of Rhode Island v. USCIS, the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island ruled that four USCIS policies were unlawful and vacated them nationwide. All four policies suspended review and/or granting of immigration benefits. The policies are as follows:

 

  • Benefits Hold Policy (PM-602-0192 and PM-602-0194). Placed an indefinite hold on final adjudication of pending applications for adjustment of status, employment authorization, and naturalization for nationals of the 39 countries affected by the travel ban.
  • Global Asylum Hold Policy (PM-602-0192). Placed a hold on all pending asylum and withholding-of-removal applications regardless of the applicant’s nationality. Required a “comprehensive review” without defining the parameters.
  • Comprehensive Re-Review Policy (PM-602-0192). Directed USCIS officers to re-review previously approved benefit grants like asylum, adjustment of status, employment authorization, and naturalization for nationals of the 39 countries affected by the travel ban. This was based only on nationality and date of entry and not an individualized indicator of risk.
  • Country-Specific Factors Policy (Policy Alert PA-2025-26). Required adjudicators to consider insufficient vetting and screening information as a significant negative factor in any discretionary immigration benefit decision for nationals of the 39 countries affected by the travel ban.

 

In its ruling, the court found that the policies were contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). INA Section 212(f) grants the President power to restrict entry at the border but does not allow freezing domestic adjudication of benefits for those already present in the U.S. The INA already imposes nondiscretionary duties on USCIS to adjudicate benefits, and USCIS cannot use internal memos to override those statutory mandates.

 

The court also found that USCIS’s memos relied on only two isolated incidents, yet applied that reasoning broadly to noncitizens from the 39 affected countries, without demonstrating the reasoned decision-making required under the APA. Further undermining the stated national security rationale, USCIS had carved out exceptions for certain athletes and physicians from the affected countries, while the President and Secretary Noem had made public statements expressing hostility toward immigrants generally, which the court found inconsistent with a genuine security justification.

 

As a result of the ruling, employers with workers whose adjustment applications, EAD renewals, or other immigration benefits placed on hold may begin to see movement on processing. Employers should still exercise caution and consult with immigration legal counsel on next steps, since USCIS has not yet issued revised guidance addressing the ruling.

 

Action Items

  1. Consult with immigration legal counsel regarding work authorizations contingent upon pending USCIS processing.

 

 

Trump Administration Appeals Court Decision to End H-1B Visa Fee

On June 11, 2026, the Trump Administration filed a notice of appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeals challenging the decision to vacate Proclamation 10973 which imposed a $100,000 fee for new H-1B petitions filed for beneficiaries located outside of the U.S. The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts had struck down the fee on June 8, 2026, but the district court issued an administrative stay of its own ruling on June 12, 2026, which reinstated the fee while the government pursues relief from the First Circuit. On June 18, 2026, the government formally asked the First Circuit to extend the stay for the duration of the appeal. As a result, USCIS is currently permitted to continue collecting the $100,000 fee for qualifying H-1B petitions involving consular processing while the appeal proceeds. Employers should continue to monitor the USCIS website and consult immigration counsel, as further changes to the fee’s status are likely as the litigation continues.

 

DHS Proposes Increase to Naturalization Application Fees

On June 23, 2026, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a proposed rule to increase the application fee for naturalization applications. The paper filing fee would increase from $760 to $1,330 and online filing fees would increase from $710 to $1,280. DHS would also eliminate the $380 reduced fee option for low-income applicants and end fee waivers. Public comments to the proposed rule must be submitted on or before August 24, 2026.

 

USCIS Updates Section 5 of M-274

On July 7, 2026, USCIS updated the M-274 Handbook for Employers. Specifically, Section 5 has been updated to reflect the changes to automatic extensions of TPS and EADs as a result of federal register notices unique to certain countries, the DHS interim final rule eliminating the automatic extension period, and other changes resulting from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. Employers should be sure to review the updated Section 5 prior to reviewing and completing Form I-9.

 

OFLC Publishes List of Randomized H-2B Applications for H-2B Workers

On July 8, 2026, the Department of Labor’s Office of Foreign Labor Certification (OFLC) published a list of randomized H-2B applications submitted during the July 3-5, 2026 filing window for H-2B workers with a work start date of October 1, 2026. OFLC cited a large number of applications filed requiring cases to be split into two groups. Group A cases are being assigned to the National Processing Center for notices of Acceptance or Deficiency. Employers were notified on July 6, 2026 of the group assignment for their application.

 

USCIS Updates EAD Expiration Dates for TPS Beneficiaries

On July 10, 2026, USCIS issued an update regarding the expiration of Employment Authorization Documents (EADs) related to Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for certain countries. DHS had previously terminated TPS designations for these countries, prompting multiple lawsuits in federal district courts that temporarily blocked the terminations. While that litigation was pending, DHS initially set a placeholder EAD expiration date of July 1, 2026, which was later extended to July 10, 2026, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Mullin v. Doe upholding DHS’s authority to terminate TPS. USCIS has now removed the July 10, 2026 expiration date and established new expiration dates of July 24, 2026, for TPS-related EADs for nationals of Haiti, and July 17, 2026, for nationals of Burma, Somalia, Yemen, Syria, Ethiopia, and South Sudan. Further changes to these dates are anticipated. Employers with employees from these countries should consult immigration counsel to confirm accurate EAD expiration dates and ensure compliance with federal requirements.


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

DOL Updates

Discussion

DOL Demands State Action on Unemployment Insurance Fraud

On June 17, 2026, the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Acting Secretary of Labor issued formal letters to governors of 53 states and territories demanding immediate action to “combat fraud, waste, and abuse within their unemployment insurance (UI) programs.” The announcement cited examples such as California’s $20 billion federal debt tied to UI mismanagement, New York’s estimated $2 million in daily fraud losses, and Illinois’s more than $320 million in improper payments. Working with the Office of the Inspector General, the DOL indicated that it will use “every available enforcement tool,” including withholding administrative funds from noncompliant states for the first time, and stated that additional guidance and directives will be issued to states in the coming weeks. Employers should monitor for state-level responses that may affect UI tax rates, audits, or claims administration in their jurisdictions.

 

DOL Confirms Trump Accounts Are Not Subject to ERISA

On June 17, 2026, the DOL issued Technical Release 2026-02 confirming that employer contributions to a child’s “Trump Account” (e.g., the newly established savings accounts funded with $1,000 federal deposits for eligible children) are not subject to Title I of ERISA. Employers may contribute up to $2,500 per year tax-free to an employee’s child’s account and may facilitate employee payroll-deduction contributions, but must remain neutral toward the program (e.g., no investment influence, no endorsement, no representation that it’s an employer-sponsored benefit) to avoid inadvertently triggering ERISA coverage. Employers considering offering this as a voluntary perk should coordinate with their benefits advisor to ensure the program is structured to stay outside ERISA’s scope.

 


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

Federal Court Updates

Discussion

Third Circuit: Retaliation Standard Under ADA and FMLA

APPLIES TO

All Employers with Employees in DE, NJ, PA, and the U.S. Virgin Islands

EFFECTIVE

JUN 24, 2026

QUESTIONS?

Contact HR On-Call

(888) 378-2456

 

Quick Look

  • The Third Circuit adopted the “materially adverse” standard for retaliation claims under the ADA and FMLA, aligning with the broader standard already applied to Title VII retaliation claims.
  • Under this standard, an action is materially adverse if it could dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity, meaning it is not limited to formal changes in job status or compensation structure.

Discussion

On June 24, 2026, the Third Circuit issued a decision in Steidle v. United States Liability Insurance Co., Inc., clarifying the scope of actionable retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). In this case, an employee claimed that his employer retaliated against him for requesting FMLA leave and workplace accommodations by giving him lower-than-expected bonuses and salary increases. The district court had granted summary judgment to the employer, finding that the plaintiff had not suffered an “adverse employment action” and failed to establish causation. The Third Circuit considered whether ADA and FMLA retaliation claims are limited to traditional employment actions affecting compensation or job status, or whether they are instead governed by the broader “materially adverse” standard the U.S. Supreme Court set for Title VII retaliation claims in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White.

 

In making its decision, the court adopted the broader standard, holding that an employer’s action is materially adverse if it could dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity, such as requesting leave or an accommodation. Applying this standard, the court rejected a narrow interpretation that would have excluded discretionary compensation decisions from scrutiny, instead concluding that reduced bonuses and salary increases, particularly when closely tied in time to protected activity, may constitute actionable retaliation.

 

This decision means that compensation decisions, including discretionary bonuses and merit increases, now squarely fall within the scope of potential ADA and FMLA retaliation exposure. This ruling also emphasizes the importance of maintaining well-documented, consistent, and objective criteria for compensation decisions, particularly for employees who have recently requested leave or an accommodation.

 

Action Items

  1. Review compensation decision-making processes for consistent, objective, performance-based criteria.
  2. Consult with legal counsel when compensation decisions closely follow an employee’s leave or accommodation request.

 

Fourth Circuit: Employee Dissatisfaction with Accommodation Is Not a Failure to Accommodate

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Employers with 15+ Employees in MD, NC, SC, VA, and WV

EFFECTIVE

MAR 3, 2026

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  • The ADA’s interactive process does not guarantee employees their preferred accommodation, and employee dissatisfaction with a reasonable accommodation does not amount to a failure to accommodate.
  • Employers retain the “ultimate discretion” to select an effective accommodation from among the reasonable options available; employees may not unilaterally dictate the terms of their accommodation.

Discussion

In Redding v. Noem, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a failure-to-accommodate claim brought under the Rehabilitation Act (the federal-employee analog to the ADA), reinforcing key principles that apply equally to ADA accommodation claims in the private sector.

 

In this case, the plaintiff worked as a federal air marshal for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for more than seven years. After developing certain medical conditions over time, she was placed on temporary “light duty” status. Eventually, TSA informed her that she could no longer meet the agency’s medical standards for her position and recommended she seek reassignment. In requesting reassignment, the employee herself acknowledged her “inability to perform the essential duties” of her position. With no open positions available within TSA, the employee applied for and was reassigned, at her own selection, to a position at another federal agency. After struggling in the new role, she sought reconsideration of her assignment, but TSA advised it could no longer assist her since she was no longer a TSA employee. She then sued, arguing TSA should have kept her permanently in the light-duty position.

 

The Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal on two independent grounds. First, the employee’s own admission that she could not perform the essential functions of her position meant she was not a “qualified individual” under the Rehabilitation Act/ADA framework. Second, even setting that aside, the court found TSA had provided a reasonable accommodation when it placed her on light duty, searched for vacant positions within TSA when she could no longer perform even the adjusted duties, and ultimately facilitated a reassignment to another agency.  Critically, because the employee herself had identified and selected the reassignment position, her later dissatisfaction with that choice did not retroactively make TSA’s accommodation “unreasonable.” As the court put it, the interactive process gives employees “a meaningful voice” but does not guarantee them their preferred outcome, and TSA’s accommodation obligations ended once the reassignment was completed.

 

For employers, this case emphasizes the importance of maintaining accurate documentation throughout the interactive process. This includes, but is not limited to, accommodation offers, employee responses, and reasons for rejecting or pursuing a particular accommodation option. Job descriptions should also clearly and accurately define essential functions, as courts give considerable deference to an employer’s judgment on what functions are essential to a role.

 

Action Items

  1. Review job descriptions for clear and accurately defined essential functions.
  2. Maintain accurate documentation of interactive process for all accommodation requests.
  3. Have appropriate personnel trained on ADA requirements.
  4. Consult with legal counsel when evaluating reassignment or other accommodations of last resort.

 

Eight Circuit: Vaccine Mandates Are Not “Essential Job Functions” Under the ADA

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All Employers with Employees in AR, IA, MN, MO, NE, ND, and SD

EFFECTIVE

JUN 15, 2026

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Quick Look

  • The court rejected the employer’s attempt to argue that a vaccine policy was itself an “essential job function.”
  • A vaccine exemption was found to be a form of accommodation, not an essential job function.

Discussion

In Klimek v. CentraCare Health System, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff’s ADA disability discrimination claim, based on a request for a medical exemption from a COVID-19 vaccine mandate, could move forward. Here, Klimek was a CentraCare nurse who suffered a workplace injury leading to Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy (RSD) which caused chronic pain, nausea, and vertigo. In 2016, CentraCare required all employees to receive the MMR vaccine for which Klimek applied for a medical exemption. CentraCare approved the exemption and said she was permanently exempt from live vaccinations while being treated for RSD. In 2021, Klimek then moved to a position as a clinical documentation integrity specialist which was 100% remote with no in-patient contact. That same year, CentraCare required all employees to obtain a COVID-19 vaccine absent a medical or religious exemption. Klimek requested a medical exemption like she had in the past, but CentraCare denied it without explanation – even after she submitted a letter explaining that she was 100% remote with no coworker or patient contact. CentraCare then placed Klimek on involuntary unpaid leave of absence which effectively ended her employment.

 

A lower court initially granted summary judgment in favor of CentraCare; however, the Eighth Circuit reversed. In reaching its decision, the court rejected CentraCare’s argument that its vaccine policy itself qualified as an “essential job function,” explaining that a vaccine exemption is an accommodation, not an essential function, and that treating the two as the same would run contrary to the ADA. Instead, the relevant question was whether in-person patient care was an essential function of Klimek’s job, and the court found that it was not. The court also found that CentraCare had knowledge of her disability based on her prior vaccine exemption requests and had received sufficient medical documentation to trigger the interactive process, which CentraCare failed to engage in.

 

This case serves as a reminder for healthcare employers that vaccine policies cannot be treated as an essential job function on their own, but must instead be tied to the specific duties of the role in question. It also underscores that once an employer has sufficient information indicating a disability, it must engage in the interactive process in good faith.

 

Action Items

  1. Review vaccine policies and practices for compliance with medical and religious exemptions.
  2. Review procedures for engaging in the interactive process when the need for a medical accommodation is known.
  3. Have appropriate personnel trained on workplace accommodation requirements.

 

Ninth Circuit: Compelling Arbitration

APPLIES TO

All Employers with Employees in AK, AZ, CA, HI, ID, MT, NV, OR, WA, Guam, and Northern Mariana Islands

EFFECTIVE

JUN 9, 2026

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Quick Look

  • The court, not the arbitrator, must determine whether the FAA, or any exceptions, apply to arbitration agreements before compelling arbitration.

Discussion

In Orr v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the Ninth Circuit said the district court erred by compelling arbitration of an employee’s individual claims without specifying the source of its authority to do so. Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court previously held in New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira that the district court, not an arbitrator, must decide whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies to an agreement before ordering arbitration.

 

Here, an employer sought to compel arbitration of a former employee’s claims filed in court. The district court said that the employee’s claims must proceed to arbitration regardless of the applicable law, so the court did not need to determine whether the federal or state arbitration law applies. In ordering the claim to arbitration without further ruling, it would have left the determination of applicable arbitration law to the arbitrator.

 

The Ninth Circuit reiterated New Prime’s instruction to courts to determine the basis of their authority to compel claims to arbitration, which was not done here. Additionally, the arbitration agreement at issue selected the FAA as controlling law unless the FAA “does not apply to a particular dispute or to one or both parties.” To enforce the agreement by its terms, the district court had to decide whether the FAA or state law supplied its authority to compel arbitration. Because the district court did not decide the contractual question (e.g., whether the FAA is applicable) the arbitrator would need to, which New Prime forbids.

 

Action Items

  1. Review arbitration agreements with legal counsel for compliance.

Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase

Other Federal Agency Updates

Discussion

SCOTUS Expands Presidential Power to Fire Members of Independent Agencies

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All Employers

EFFECTIVE

JUN 26, 2026

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  • The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that statutory removal protections for FTC Commissioners violate the separation of powers, holding that the President may remove such subordinates at will.
  • While the case directly addressed only the FTC, the ruling has significant implications for other independent agencies with similar removal protections, including the NLRB and EEOC.

Discussion

On June 26, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in Trump v. Slaughter, substantially expanding presidential authority to remove members of independent federal agencies. While the case centered on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the ruling’s implications extend far beyond that agency, with likely consequences for other independent agencies critical to the workplace, including the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

 

As background, in 2025, President Trump fired two Democratic FTC Commissioners without articulating cause. One of them, former Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, challenged her termination as unlawful and was reinstated by a federal district court. The Trump administration appealed, arguing that the FTC Act’s statutory removal protections were unconstitutional. Those protections allow commissioners to be removed only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance,” and had been upheld as constitutional in the Supreme Court’s 1935 decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States. The Humphrey’s Executor case had determined that FTC commissioners performed “quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative” duties that placed them beyond the President’s unilateral removal power.

 

Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court held that the FTC Act’s removal protections violate the separation of powers and that the President may remove his subordinates at will. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts explained that today’s FTC “performs tasks that fall well within the heartland of executive power” and enforces around 80 federal laws central to the U.S. economy. The Court concluded that subordinates who exercise the President’s power must remain accountable to the President in order for the President to remain accountable to the people. In reaching this conclusion, the majority overruled Humphrey’s Executor, finding it tethered to an outdated and “almost fictional” view of the FTC’s role.

 

Although Trump v. Slaughter directly concerned the FTC, the overruling of Humphrey’s Executor is expected to have ripple effects across other independent agencies with similar for-cause removal protections, particularly the NLRB and EEOC. Employers should anticipate that the FTC, NLRB, and EEOC may become more directly responsive to the sitting administration’s policy priorities going forward, with enforcement approaches potentially shifting more significantly between administrations. This is particularly relevant given the FTC’s expanding role in employment-related issues such as noncompetes, labor market antitrust concerns, worker classification, and employee data privacy.

 

Action Items

  1. Monitor developments regarding the composition and enforcement priorities of the FTC, NLRB, and EEOC.
  2. Consult with legal counsel regarding pending matters before the NLRB or EEOC, in light of the agencies’ evolving structural posture.

 

EEOC Rescinds Guidance on Permissible Affirmative Action

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All Employers

EFFECTIVE

JUN 30, 2026

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Quick Look

  • The EEOC rescinded its regulatory guidelines on “appropriate” affirmative action under Title VII, as well as Section 607 of its Compliance Manual addressing those guidelines.
  • The rescission eliminates employers’ ability to rely on the Section 713(b)(1) good-faith reliance defense with respect to this guidance.
  • The rescission does not overturn existing Supreme Court precedent recognizing that Title VII may permit certain voluntary affirmative action plans in limited circumstances, but it signals continued scrutiny of race- and sex-conscious employment practices.

Discussion

On June 30, 2026, the EEOC announced that it had rescinded two documents relating to permissible affirmative action under Title VII: (1) its regulatory guidelines on “appropriate” affirmative action, and (2) Section 607 of its Compliance Manual, which addressed those guidelines and the agency’s enforcement position on affirmative action plans.

 

The rescinded guidance had explained that voluntary affirmative action plans were only lawful under federal EEO law when designed to remedy past or present discrimination, or to address manifest imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories, and only if narrowly tailored, temporary, flexible, and structured to avoid unnecessarily disadvantaging non-beneficiaries. Perhaps most significantly, the guidance provided a safe harbor under Section 713(b)(1) of the Civil Rights Act, allowing employers to defend against an unlawful employment practice claim by demonstrating good-faith reliance on the EEOC’s written guidance. With this rescission, that defense is no longer available to employers relying on the now-rescinded documents.

 

Importantly, the rescission does not overturn the Supreme Court’s decisions in United Steelworkers v. Weber (1979) and Johnson v. Transportation Agency (1987), which recognized that Title VII may permit certain voluntary affirmative action plans in limited circumstances. Whether those precedents remain good law is a question only the Supreme Court can resolve, notwithstanding the EEOC’s position that rescission is “consistent with the text of Title VII and Supreme Court precedent.” Nonetheless, this action is consistent with other recent EEOC and Trump administration efforts to scrutinize the consideration of race and sex in employment decision-making.

 

Action Items

  1. Review existing voluntary affirmative action plans and practices with legal counsel.
  2. Continue to monitor related EEOC guidance affecting affirmative action and DEI-related practices.
  3. Have appropriate personnel trained on updated compliance obligations.

 

 

DOJ Opinion Letter on EEOC Disparate Impact Guidelines

On June 9, 2026, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel issued an opinion concluding that the EEOC’s disparate-impact liability guidelines under Title VII are unconstitutional, finding they improperly pressured employers to engage in racial discrimination. The opinion, which implements Executive Order 14281, clarifies that employers may use job-related hiring practices (such as aptitude tests, background checks, and standardized test scores) without fear of Title VII liability simply because they produce different outcomes across demographic groups, so long as the practice is reasonable or serves a valid business purpose. The opinion also raises the bar for disparate-impact plaintiffs, who must now show both that a specific practice directly caused the unequal outcome and that an equally effective, less discriminatory alternative exists. Employers should be aware that this is a DOJ/EEOC interpretive opinion rather than a change in the text of Title VII itself, and that state-level disparate impact protections remain unaffected.

 

New “Faster Labor Contracts Act” Advances to Senate

On June 9, 2026, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Faster Labor Contracts Act (HR 5408), which would significantly accelerate first-contract bargaining timelines by requiring employers to begin negotiations within 10 days of union certification, imposing a 90-day bargaining period, and mandating mediation followed by binding interest arbitration if the parties fail to reach agreement. The bill now moves to the Senate, where it will likely need 60 votes to overcome a filibuster. Because this legislation remains pending, employers should monitor its progress for now.

 

ILO Adopts a Convention Governing Platform Workers

On June 12, 2026, the International Labour Organization (ILO) (the tripartite U.N. agency that brings together governments, employers, and workers from 187 member states to set international labor standards) voted to adopt the “Decent Work in the Platform Economy Convention,” establishing an international framework for laws governing digital platform work, including minimum wage guarantees, protections against unlawful termination, and rights related to automated management and data protection. The United States was among eight countries voting no, and the Convention is unlikely to be ratified domestically, though it is expected to be ratified by numerous other member countries, including several in the European Union. U.S. employers with international operations should monitor ratification developments in the countries where they operate.

 

Senate Committee Advances NO FAKES Act to Protect Against Unauthorized AI Likeness Use

On June 18, 2026, the Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously advanced the NO FAKES Act (S. 4591), which would create a new federal intellectual property right allowing individuals to control the use of AI-generated “digital replicas” of their voice or likeness, and would establish a notice-and-takedown process for unauthorized use. The bill now heads to the full Senate, with a companion bill still pending in the House. Employers, particularly those in media, entertainment, marketing, or that use AI tools involving employee or public likenesses, should monitor its progress.

 

EPA Aligns with OSHA 2024 Hazard Communications Standard

On June 22, 2026, the EPA finalized a rule aligning its Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) hazardous chemical inventory reporting categories with OSHA’s 2024 Hazard Communication Standard, allowing facilities to use their OSHA-compliant safety data sheet (SDS) hazard classifications directly for EPCRA Tier I/Tier II reporting rather than maintaining separate categorization systems. The rule takes effect August 21, 2026, but facilities have until January 1, 2028 to come into compliance. Core EPCRA obligations (SDS/chemical list submissions, annual inventory reporting, and the March 1 Tier II deadline) remain unchanged. Facilities with hazardous chemical inventories should begin reviewing SDS classifications, updating reporting workflows and software, refreshing written EPCRA procedures, and coordinating with state/local emergency planning authorities ahead of the compliance deadline.


Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase