Federal Court Updates
Second Circuit: Expanded Interpretation of Protected Activity Under Title VII Anti-Retaliation Clause
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APPLIES TO All Employers with Employees in CT, NY, and VT |
EFFECTIVE SEP 21, 2026 |
QUESTIONS? Contact HR On-Call |
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Discussion
In Newton v. LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton Inc., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that refusing to settle retaliation claims can be a protected activity under Title VII in this particular case, and the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA) does not apply to certain claims because they accrued before its effective date. Here, the plaintiff was hired as in-house litigation counsel and signed an arbitration agreement. She alleged that the company director sexually harassed her between 2015 and 2018, but subsequent internal investigations dismissed the allegations and found no policy violations. She also alleged that the General Counsel then retaliated against her by limiting the cases assigned to her, giving her a negative performance review, denying remote work during the COVID-19 pandemic, denying a promotion, and excluding her from certain events. She was invited to testify before the U.S. Congress about the harassment and claimed that the retaliation increased. She was then terminated. While still employed, she brought claims under New York state law for retaliation and harassment. These claims were moved to arbitration. A separate federal action was filed after her termination for retaliation and hostile work environment under Title VII and New York state law. The action also sought to enjoin the ongoing arbitration.
For her claim of retaliation under Title VII and New York state law, the plaintiff argued that her refusal to meet with her supervisor to discuss settlement of the claims she filed prior to her termination was protected activity. In reaching its ruling, the court considered “whether the employer understood or could reasonably have understood that the plaintiff’s refusal was an assertion of her continued opposition to the employer’s unlawful employment practices in violation of Title VII.” The court agreed that this was a reasonable conclusion. The plaintiff had continuously and publicly pursued her claims for three years prior to the refusal to discuss settlement. The court stopped short of ruling that any such refusal was a protected activity – only that it was under these specific circumstances.
As to the claim that the EFAA voided the arbitration agreement, the court found the EFAA only applies to disputes or claims that arise or accrue on or after March 3, 2022. Her new claims for hostile work environment were materially identical to her original claim filed in June 2021, so they accrued before the EFAA took effect. The claims did not “re-accrue” after March 3, 2022. They were not a continuing violation that could void the arbitration agreement. Additionally, an amended complaint has no legal effect unless leave to amend is granted, so the proposed claims never became a part of the plaintiff’s federal case. Employers should note the ruling in this case is narrow and applies to the specific circumstances in this particular case. Employers should always consult with legal counsel regarding arbitration agreements and before taking an adverse action against an employee who has made a claim of harassment, discrimination, or retaliation.
Action Items
- Review arbitration agreements with legal counsel.
- Promptly investigate claims of harassment, discrimination, and retaliation.
- Consult with legal counsel prior to taking adverse action against an employee who has engaged in potentially protected activity.
- Have appropriate personnel trained on responding to employee complaints.
Second Circuit: Required Early Arrival May Result in Compensable Time
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APPLIES TO All Employers with Employees in CT, NY, and VT |
EFFECTIVE OCT 13, 2026 |
QUESTIONS? Contact HR On-Call |
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Discussion
In Santos v. Lidl US, LLC, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that waiting time is compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) when an employer requires an employee to report at a certain time to be ready to work and, for reasons beyond the employee’s control, there is no work to be done. Here, the plaintiff store clerk and stocker worked an opening shift where she was required to report 15 minutes before the listed start time. However, employees could not clock in until the store was unlocked. Sometimes opening managers were late to unlock the store. The plaintiff alleged that this resulted in 15 minutes of unpaid wages per week, some of which resulted in overtime, in violation of the FLSA’s and the New York Labor Law’s (NYLL) prohibition on time-shaving.
The court’s ruling relied on 29 C.F.R. Section 790.7(h) interpreting the Portal-to-Portal Act, which distinguishes an employee who “was engaged to wait” (compensable) from one who “waited to be engaged” (not compensable). Waiting is not compensable when the employee arrives voluntarily before the time the employer requires, but, here, the employee was required to arrive early. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that employees could use the time for their own purposes, like reading or paying bills. The court also found that compensable time where the employee was “engaged to wait” is not limited to traditional on-call employees like firefighters and limousine drivers as the defendant argued. The court also failed to find that fifteen minutes of uncompensated work time per week was de minimis. This interpretation was also applied to the NYLL claim which was considered as falling within the FLSA claim. Requiring employees to arrive before their shifts begin and before they can clock in may create compensable waiting time.
Action Items
- Review and revise scheduling and timekeeping procedures, if applicable.
- Have appropriate personnel trained on scheduling and timekeeping requirements.
Fourth Circuit: No Religious Employer Exemptions for Non-Ministerial Workers
On October 16, 2026, in Doe v. Catholic Relief Services, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that terminating a non-ministerial employee’s dependent health insurance benefits for his same-sex spouse violated Title VII and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act. Here, a data analyst with the defendant received health coverage for himself and his husband. The coverage was subsequently revoked after internal discussions about Catholic doctrine on same-sex marriage. The court found Title VII’s religious-employer exemption does not shield religious organizations from liability for discrimination based on sex, race, or national origin, even when the employment decision is motivated by religious belief. In addition, neither the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) nor the church autonomy doctrine provided immunity involving a non-ministerial employee. Religious employers should be aware that the ruling reinforces a clear distinction between protected ministerial positions and administrative and technical positions.
Fifth Circuit: Qualified Immunity Does Not Shield Public Officials From FLSA Retaliation Claims
On October 27, 2026, in Stramaski v. Lawley, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that public officials sued personally for retaliation under the FLSA cannot invoke qualified immunity, a defense that typically shields officials from certain lawsuits arising from their official duties. The case involved a public-university employee who alleged that her supervisor fired her after she asserted her right to timely pay. The court concluded that extending qualified immunity to FLSA retaliation claims would undermine the law’s protection of employees who assert wage-and-hour rights. While the ruling allowed the claim to proceed, it did not establish that retaliation occurred, meaning the supervisor may still contest the allegations on their merits. Public employers in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi should ensure supervisors understand the FLSA’s anti-retaliation protections and that employment decisions involving employees who raise pay concerns should be supported by legitimate, documented reasons.
Ninth Circuit: Court Upholds Block on California’s Captive Audience Law
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APPLIES TO As Indicated |
EFFECTIVE OCT 29, 2026 |
QUESTIONS? Contact HR On-Call |
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Discussion
In California Chamber of Commerce v. Bonta, the Ninth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction blocking California officials from enforcing SB 399 while the legal challenge proceeds. The court concluded that the employer associations challenging the law were likely to succeed on their First Amendment claim. Of note, this ruling only preserves the preliminary block on enforcement of the law, rather than finally resolving the lawsuit.
SB 399, which took effect January 1, 2025, prohibits employers from taking or threatening adverse action against employees who decline to attend employer-sponsored meetings or receive communications intended to convey the employer’s opinions about political or religious matters. Political matters include legislation, regulation, and decisions to join or support a political or labor organization. The law also requires continued pay for employees who are working when a covered meeting occurs but choose not to attend.
In this case, the state argued that the law regulates employer conduct, not speech, because it restricts adverse action against employees rather than prohibiting employers from expressing their views. The court disagreed, opining that whether the law applies depends on the message communicated at the meeting, making it a restriction based on speech content. The court also determined that the law singles out the employer’s opinions for regulation.
Therefore, the court applied strict scrutiny, which requires a law to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. It rejected California’s argument that protecting employees as a “captive audience” justified these content-based restrictions on private workplace speech. Based on that analysis, the court found that the challengers were likely to prevail on their First Amendment claim. Notably, the court did not decide whether the National Labor Relations Act preempts SB 399.
Although the ruling directly concerns the parties in this case and California’s SB 399, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning may affect the enforceability of similar captive-audience laws in other states within the circuit, including Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington. The decision does not itself block those laws, but it may support challenges to comparable restrictions on employer speech. Employers should continue to monitor legal interpretations of similar restrictions in their jurisdictions.
Action Items
- Review the ruling’s implications with legal counsel before revising workplace meeting policies or practices.
- Monitor further proceedings for changes to the injunction or for a final ruling.
Tenth Circuit: Employment Class is Scrutinized for FAA Exemption
On September 1, 2026, in Joyner v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals said that whether a class of employees qualified for the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) exemption as a “transportation worker,” thereby exempting them from being compelled to arbitration, must be determined based on what work the whole group of workers typically does, not just the named representatives of the class. Here, the class action representatives worked at airline ticket counters and boarding gates at the airport and claimed they regularly handled passenger luggage, part of the interstate movement of goods. However, working for a transportation company doesn’t automatically make someone a transportation worker exempt from the FAA. The court did not decide whether the employees actually qualify as transportation workers. It sent the case back to the trial court to define the group correctly and apply the test again.
Eleventh Circuit: Courts To Consider Discrimination Evidence as a Whole
On September 1, 2026, in Hall v. Coal Bed Services, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit reversed a ruling dismissing race discrimination and retaliation claims before trial, finding sufficient evidence for the claims to proceed to a jury. In this case, two Black employees presented evidence that a White coworker who also refused a drug test received more favorable pay and reinstatement treatment, despite differences in his duties and tenure. They also identified inconsistencies in the employer’s explanation for the test, which it described as random to the EEOC but later attributed to a report of suspected drug use. Considering this evidence alongside testimony about unequal work assignments and advancement opportunities, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence for a jury to consider the employees’ race discrimination and retaliation claims. The decision serves as a reminder to employers in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia that courts consider circumstantial evidence collectively, sometimes described as a “convincing mosaic,” and that favorable treatment of a coworker may be relevant even when that employee is not similarly situated in all material respects. It also illustrates how inconsistent explanations can undermine an employer’s defense.
Eleventh Circuit: Internal Plan Appeals Not Required for ERISA Statutory Claims
On October 13, 2026, in Bolton v. Inland Fresh Seafood Corporation of America, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals overruled its longstanding precedent requiring participants to exhaust a benefit plan’s internal claims and appeals process before filing statutory claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The ruling, which applies retroactively, allows participants to bring claims such as breach of fiduciary duty or retaliation directly in court without first completing that process. Importantly, the decision does not eliminate the exhaustion requirement for claims seeking benefits under a plan. Employers and plan sponsors in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia should be aware that statutory ERISA claims may now proceed without an opportunity to address them through internal plan procedures. Plan sponsors should review plan documents and summary plan descriptions with benefits counsel to ensure that exhaustion requirements for benefit claims are clearly stated as mandatory and are distinguished from statutory claims.
D.C. Circuit: Court Clarifies Business Necessity Defense for Layoff Practices
On September 4, 2026, in Davis v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld judgment for the District on racial disparate impact claims challenging two reduction-in-force practices: (1) consolidating two support positions into a smaller number of hybrid roles and (2) selecting additional employees for termination based on operational needs identified through management consultations. Although Black employees were disproportionately affected, the court held that the practices reasonably fit the agency’s legitimate interests in meeting substantial budget cuts while maintaining essential public services. The court explained that business necessity requires a reasonable, not perfect, fit between the challenged practice and the employer’s legitimate interests. The employees also failed to identify a sufficiently specific, equally effective alternative with less disparate impact. The decision illustrates the importance of connecting particular layoff practices to operational needs, rather than relying solely on a general need to reduce costs. Employers planning a reduction in force should work closely with legal counsel to document the rationale for their selection practices and assess potential discriminatory effects and alternatives.
Maryland District Court: Denies Preliminary Injunction of Executive Order 14398
On October 14, 2026, in National Association of Diversity Officers in Higher Education v. Trump, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland denied a preliminary injunction to prevent implementation of Executive Order 14398 while legal challenges continue. The executive order requires federal contracts and subcontracts to include a clause that the contractor will not engage in any racially discriminatory DEI activities. For the purposes of the executive order, “racially discriminatory DEI activities” means disparate treatment based on race or ethnicity in the recruitment, employment (e.g., hiring, promotions), contracting (e.g., vendor agreements), program participation, or allocation or deployment of an entity’s resources. The court stated that it denied the preliminary injunction because the executive order was narrow and only applied to work that was performed under covered contracts. Contractors also had the right to challenge any enforcement action made under the executive order. Federal contractors should continue to monitor the status of the executive order and consult with their legal counsel as there are other legal challenges pending.
Disclaimer: This document is designed to provide general information and guidance concerning employment-related issues. It is presented with the understanding that ManagEase is not engaged in rendering any legal opinions. If a legal opinion is needed, please contact the services of your own legal adviser. © 2026 ManagEase
